Comparison Overview
Ardagh Group

Ardagh Group
L - 2134 Luxembourg,, None, 56 Rue Charles Martel, None, LU, None
Last Update: 10/03/2026
We are a global supplier of sustainable, infinitely recyclable, metal and glass packaging for brand owners around the world. We operate 60 production facilities in 16 countries, employing approximately 19,000 people. The consistent pursuit of market-leading innovation, ...

Amcor
Thurgauerstrasse 34, Zurich, CH, CH-8050
Last Update: 01/04/2026
As a global leader in packaging solutions for consumer and healthcare products, our industry-leading innovation capabilities, global scale and technical expertise help our customers grow and meet the needs of millions of consumers every day. We accelerate the possible b...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Ardagh Group







Amcor






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Packaging and Containers Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Ardagh Group in 2026.
Incidents vs Packaging and Containers Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Amcor in 2026.
Incident History - Ardagh Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Ardagh Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Amcor (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Amcor cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Ardagh Group

Amcor
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.