Comparison Overview
ArcelorMittal Engineering Products Ostrava

ArcelorMittal Engineering Products Ostrava
N/A
Last Update: 22/02/2026
ArcelorMittal Engineering Products Ostrava is a subsidiary of ArcelorMittal Ostrava, the largest steel making company in the Czech Republic, which owns 100 % of the share in the company.

John Deere
Moline, 61265, US
Last Update: 24/09/2026
It doesn’t matter if you’ve never driven a tractor, mowed a lawn, or operated a dozer. With John Deere’s role in helping produce food, fiber, fuel, and infrastructure, we work for every single person on the planet. It all started nearly 200 years ago with a steel plow...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ArcelorMittal Engineering Products Ostrava







John Deere






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ArcelorMittal Engineering Products Ostrava in 2026.
Incidents vs Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for John Deere in 2026.
Incident History - ArcelorMittal Engineering Products Ostrava (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ArcelorMittal Engineering Products Ostrava cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - John Deere (X = Date, Y = Severity)
John Deere cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ArcelorMittal Engineering Products Ostrava

John Deere
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.