Comparison Overview
Applied Materials Taiwan

Applied Materials Taiwan
Hsinchu , TW
Last Update: 02/04/2026
應用材料公司是提供材料工程解決方案的領導者,我們的設備用來製造幾近世界上每顆新式晶片與先進顯示器。我們以工業規模在原子層級進行材料改質的專業,協助客戶將可能轉化成真。在應用材料公司,我們引領材料創新,驅動世界的關鍵變革。 台灣應用材料公司自 1989 年在台營運,深耕台灣三十五年,厚植技術創新、人才培育與社會關懷。我們擁有獨一無二的設施,包括位於桃園的亞洲設備零組件物流中心、新竹的全球技術培訓中心、台南的顯示器設備製造中心與研發實驗室,以及半導體設備製造中心與維修中心,致力攜手台灣半導體及顯示器產業生態系,推動技術創新與發展。 ...

STMicroelectronics
39, Chemin du Champ des Filles, C. P. 21, Geneva, Switzerland, CH, CH 1228 Plan-Les-Ouates
Last Update: 06/07/2026
ST is a global semiconductor leader delivering intelligent and energy-efficient products and solutions that power the electronics at the heart of everyday life. ST’s products are found everywhere today, and together with our customers, we are enabling smarter driving an...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Applied Materials Taiwan







STMicroelectronics






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Applied Materials Taiwan in 2026.
Incidents vs Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
STMicroelectronics has 94.17% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Applied Materials Taiwan (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Applied Materials Taiwan cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - STMicroelectronics (X = Date, Y = Severity)
STMicroelectronics cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Applied Materials Taiwan

STMicroelectronics
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In OpenStack Ironic before 38.0.1, the autodetect deploy interface may fail to run cleaning immediately after enrollment with, or changing to, the autodetect deploy interface.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. A user with FEATURE_BUILD_SUPPORT enabled and repository write access can exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within the build API. This allows the user to provide a malicious URL, causing the Quay builder to make requests to internal network addresses. Such an action could lead to the disclosure of sensitive internal information.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's exported logs feature. An unauthenticated attacker with a valid file ID could download exported action logs without proper authorization. While file IDs are complex, they can be intercepted from plaintext email or webhook callbacks. This vulnerability leads to information disclosure, potentially exposing sensitive data such as usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and action-specific metadata.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's Stripe billing webhook handler. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge billing events by sending crafted JSON requests to the `/webhooks/stripe` endpoint without validating the Stripe-Signature header. Successful exploitation can lead to the unauthorized resetting of a namespace's build quota to its maximum and trigger unsolicited billing emails to namespace administrators.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. When the SECURITY_SCANNER_V4_PSK (pre-shared key) is not set, a remote unauthenticated attacker can send POST requests to the security scanner notification endpoint. This allows the attacker to flood the notification queue and inject path traversal characters into Clair API URL paths. The primary consequence is worker resource exhaustion and blind path manipulation on the configured Clair host, potentially leading to a denial of service.