Comparison Overview
Applied Materials - Israel
Applied Materials - Israel
Prof. Hillel ve-Khanan Oppenheimer St 9, , Rehovot, 7670109, IL
Last Update: 15/02/2026
Applied Materials is the leader in materials engineering solutions used to produce virtually every new chip and advanced display in the world. Our expertise in modifying materials at atomic levels and on an industrial scale enables customers to transform possibilities i...
Broadcom
3401 Hillview Ave, Palo Alto, California, US, 94304
Last Update: 30/07/2026
Broadcom provides semiconductors and infrastructure software for global organizations’ complex, mission-critical needs. We combine long-term R&D investment with superb execution to deliver the best technology, at scale. Through focus and expertise, Broadcom sets the st...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Applied Materials - Israel
Broadcom
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Applied Materials - Israel in 2026.
Incidents vs Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
Broadcom has 191.26% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Applied Materials - Israel (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Applied Materials - Israel cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Broadcom (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Broadcom cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Applied Materials - Israel
Broadcom
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A security vulnerability has been detected in adafap api-mcp up to 92b9a5d04acfec165c7d4ef852496593aa87be06. This affects the function customAxios of the file app/api/proxy/route.ts of the component Proxy API Endpoint. The manipulation of the argument url leads to server-side request forgery. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. This product adopts a rolling release strategy to maintain continuous delivery. Therefore, version details for affected or updated releases cannot be specified. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A weakness has been identified in PhialsBasement KoboldCPP-MCP-Server 1.0.0. Affected by this issue is the function makeRequest of the file src/index.ts of the component BaseConfigSchema. Executing a manipulation of the argument apiUrl can lead to server-side request forgery. It is possible to launch the attack on the local host. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A security flaw has been discovered in Handwriting-OCR handwriting-ocr-mcp-server 0.1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function fs.readFileSync of the file src/index.ts of the component upload_document. Performing a manipulation of the argument File results in path traversal. Attacking locally is a requirement. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A vulnerability was identified in Nikolaibibo claude-comfyui-mcp 1.0.0. Affected is the function copyFileSync of the file src/tools/utils.ts of the component comfy_upload_image. Such manipulation of the argument image_path leads to path traversal. An attack has to be approached locally. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in nltk/nltk versions 3.9.4 and the current develop branch. The `nltk.pathsec.validate_network_url()` function, intended to prevent SSRF by rejecting internal network addresses, fails to reject IPs in the RFC 6598 shared address space (`100.64.0.0/10`). This occurs because Python's `ipaddress` module does not classify such addresses as `is_private` or `is_global`, and the current guard only checks `is_private` and a few explicit categories. An attacker who can influence a URL passed to NLTK's network-loading helpers can exploit this vulnerability to make a strict-mode application send requests to shared-address-space hosts, potentially exposing non-public infrastructure reachable from the application host. The impact is limited to SSRF-style confidentiality exposure, with no code execution claimed.