Comparison Overview
Apple Vacations

Apple Vacations
7 Campus Blvd, Newtown Square, 19073, US
Last Update: 16/03/2026
🌍 Stay connected with us! Follow ALG Vacations® on LinkedIn for the latest updates. Apple Vacations® is a part of ALG Vacations—the service behind the brand, delivering the expertise and support that power an incredible portfolio of travel experiences. While this pa...

Costa Crociere S.p.A.
Piazza Piccapietra 48, Genova, IT, 16121
Last Update: 20/09/2026
Costa belongs to the Carnival Corporation & plc Group, listed on the London and New York stock exchanges, the largest cruise company in the world. Costa, the only Italian cruise company flying the Italian flag, has been sailing the world’s seas for more than 75 years,...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Apple Vacations







Costa Crociere S.p.A.






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Travel Arrangements Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Apple Vacations in 2026.
Incidents vs Travel Arrangements Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Costa Crociere S.p.A. in 2026.
Incident History - Apple Vacations (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Apple Vacations cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Costa Crociere S.p.A. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Costa Crociere S.p.A. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Apple Vacations

Costa Crociere S.p.A.
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.