Comparison Overview
ANZ Worldline Payment Solutions

ANZ Worldline Payment Solutions
727 Collins St, Docklands, Victoria, 3008, AU
Last Update: 10/03/2026
ANZ Worldline Payment Solutions provides simple and secure payment acceptance services to merchants right across Australia. ANZ Worldline Payment Solutions is a partnership between ANZ Bank and Worldline – Europe’s #1 payments provider and one of the largest transactio...

Edward Jones
12555 Manchester Road, St. Louis, MO, US, 63131
Last Update: 29/03/2026
Edward Jones is a leading North American financial services firm in the U.S. and through its affiliate in Canada. The firm’s more than 20,000 financial advisors throughout North America serve more than 9 million clients with a total of $2.2 trillion in client assets und...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ANZ Worldline Payment Solutions







Edward Jones






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ANZ Worldline Payment Solutions in 2026.
Incidents vs Financial Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Edward Jones in 2026.
Incident History - ANZ Worldline Payment Solutions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ANZ Worldline Payment Solutions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Edward Jones (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Edward Jones cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ANZ Worldline Payment Solutions

Edward Jones
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.