Comparison Overview
ANDRITZ Pumps

ANDRITZ Pumps
Stattegger Straße 18, Graz, 8045, AT
Last Update: 19/03/2026
The internationally renowned ANDRITZ GROUP has been building pumps for more than 165 years. We offer innovative and customized solutions with pumps and complete pumping stations for various industries such as water and waste water management, pulp and paper, food appli...

Finning
CA
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Finning is the world's largest Caterpillar dealer delivering unrivalled service for over 90 years. We sell, rent and provide parts and service for equipment and engines to customers in various industries, including mining, construction, petroleum, forestry and a wide ra...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ANDRITZ Pumps







Finning






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ANDRITZ Pumps in 2026.
Incidents vs Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Finning in 2026.
Incident History - ANDRITZ Pumps (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ANDRITZ Pumps cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Finning (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Finning cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ANDRITZ Pumps

Finning
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.