Comparison Overview
Amentum UK and International

Amentum UK and International
303 Bridgewater Place, Warrington, WA3 6XF, GB
Last Update: 26/12/2025
Amentum International is a trusted partner delivering industry-leading engineering, programme and project management, and scientific consultancy services. With over 7,300 highly skilled employees across the UK, Australia, France, Slovakia, Poland, Norway, Lithuania, Sou...

General Atomics
3550 General Atomics Ct, San Diego, 92121, US
Last Update: 28/03/2026
The freedom to explore. The promise to deliver. General Atomics, based in San Diego, CA, develops advanced technology solutions for government and commercial applications. Privately owned and vertically integrated, we have the freedom to invest in the most innovative ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Amentum UK and International







General Atomics






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Defense and Space Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Amentum UK and International in 2026.
Incidents vs Defense and Space Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for General Atomics in 2026.
Incident History - Amentum UK and International (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Amentum UK and International cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - General Atomics (X = Date, Y = Severity)
General Atomics cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Amentum UK and International

General Atomics
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.