Comparison Overview
Amazon Fashion & Sports

Amazon Fashion & Sports
1 Principal Place, London, EC2A 2BA, GB
Last Update: 21/03/2026
At Amazon Fashion & Sports, we don't just support your business, we can help take it to the next level. With our technology, fulfilment network, and e-commerce expertise, you can devote yourself to what you love most—whether that's crafting exciting collections, creatin...

Coach
10 Hudson Yards, New York, NY, US, 10001
Last Update: 29/03/2026
Coach was founded in 1941 as a family-run workshop. In a Manhattan loft, six artisans handcrafted a collection of leather goods using skills handed down from generation to generation. Discerning consumers soon began to seek out the quality and unique nature of Coach cra...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Amazon Fashion & Sports







Coach






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Retail Apparel and Fashion Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Amazon Fashion & Sports in 2026.
Incidents vs Retail Apparel and Fashion Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Coach in 2026.
Incident History - Amazon Fashion & Sports (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Amazon Fashion & Sports cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Coach (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Coach cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Amazon Fashion & Sports

Coach
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal vulnerability in MultiAgentMonitor that fails to sanitize agent IDs when building file paths. Attackers can include traversal sequences like ../ in agent IDs to read, write, or overwrite arbitrary files, enabling sensitive disclosure, denial of service, or code execution.
PraisonAI before 1.5.115 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MultiAgentLedger component that allows attackers to access sensitive data by registering agents with duplicate IDs. Attackers can exploit the lack of agent ID uniqueness enforcement to share ledger instances and expose system prompts and conversation history between agents.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 contains a cross-origin agent execution vulnerability in the AGUI endpoint that allows remote attackers to trigger arbitrary agent execution. The POST /agui endpoint lacks authentication and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * headers, combined with Starlette's Content-Type-agnostic JSON parsing, enabling attackers to bypass CORS preflight checks via simple requests and exfiltrate sensitive agent responses including tool execution results and environment data.
PraisonAI before 4.5.128 contains an arbitrary shell command execution vulnerability where the UI modules hardcode approval_mode to auto, overriding administrator configuration from PRAISON_APPROVAL_MODE environment variable. Authenticated attackers can instruct the LLM agent to execute arbitrary shell commands via subprocess.run with shell=True, bypassing the manual approval gate and insufficient command sanitization blocklists.
PraisonAI before 1.5.128 caches tool approval decisions by tool name only, not by invocation arguments, allowing subsequent execute_command calls to bypass approval prompts. Attackers can exploit this by obtaining initial approval for a benign command, then silently exfiltrate API keys and credentials via subsequent shell commands without user consent.