Comparison Overview
Alpargatas S.A.

Alpargatas S.A.
Av. das Nações Unidas, 14.261, São Paulo, 04794-000, BR
Last Update: 12/09/2026
We are a global company, founded and based in Brazil for over 115 years. We are committed to delight the world with amazing brands, that convey lightness and joy to the everyday lives of our consumers. We own Havaianas brand, world leader in open shoes, known for the ic...

Electrolux Group
Electrolux - Stockholm, Stockholm, SE, SE-10545
Last Update: 12/09/2026
Electrolux Group is a leading global appliance company that has shaped living for the better for more than 100 years. We reinvent taste, care and wellbeing experiences for millions of people, always striving to be at the forefront of sustainability in society through ou...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Alpargatas S.A.







Electrolux Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Alpargatas S.A. in 2026.
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Electrolux Group in 2026.
Incident History - Alpargatas S.A. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Alpargatas S.A. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Electrolux Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Electrolux Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Alpargatas S.A.

Electrolux Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.