Comparison Overview
ALEC FACADES

ALEC FACADES
Office 802 , Dubai , Dubai , AE
Last Update: 02/04/2026
ALEC Facades - A Subsidiary of ALEC Engineering and contracting. ALEC Facades is a solutions orientated & integrated facade provider that aims at disrupting the traditional sourcing value chain for developers by partnering with experienced, cost efficient, and technolog...

VINCI
1973, Boulevard de la Défense, Nanterre, 92000, FR
Last Update: 07/10/2026
VINCI is a world leader in concessions, energy and construction, employing 280.000 people in more than 120 countries. We design, finance, build and operate infrastructure and facilities that help improve daily life and mobility for all. Because we believe in all-roun...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ALEC FACADES







VINCI






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ALEC FACADES in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for VINCI in 2026.
Incident History - ALEC FACADES (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ALEC FACADES cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - VINCI (X = Date, Y = Severity)
VINCI cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ALEC FACADES

VINCI
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to exposure of session tokens in the HTML response.
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an XML external entity (XXE) injection flaw.
IBM Aspera Enterprise WebApps 1.0.0 through 1.0.6 could allow a local attacker to obtain sensitive information due to cleartext transmission of sensitive information.
IBM Planning Analytics 2.0, and 2.1 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to a stack-based buffer overflow.
IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 can allow a man-in-the-middle attacker to present a forged TLS certificate, intercept the connection, and capture the IAM bearer Authorization header automatically attached by the session adapter. The captured token grants full platform-scope tenant API access, enabling the attacker to read and manipulate the victim's DataStage projects, flows, assets, and pipeline definitions. This is client-side SDK code running on the user's own machine, so exploitation requires an external network interceptor rather than a co-tenant in the shared cluster.