Comparison Overview
Ajinomoto del Perú S.A.

Ajinomoto del Perú S.A.
Av. Vía Expresa Luis Fernán Bedoya Reyes 2455, La Victoria, Lima, Lima, PE, 15034
Last Update: 18/03/2026
Somos una de las empresas líderes en el sector de alimentos y sazonadores en el mercado peruano. Este es un mérito que construimos desde 1968, año en que inauguramos nuestras oficinas en Lima. Han pasado más de 50 años y tenemos el orgullo de formar parte de una histo...

Compass Group
Compass House, Chertsey, KT16 9BQ, GB
Last Update: 05/09/2026
Compass Group is a global leader in food services operating in over 25 countries with around 590,000 employees worldwide and generating underlying revenues of over $46 billion for the 2025 fiscal year. Our vision is to be a world-class provider of contract food services...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Ajinomoto del Perú S.A.







Compass Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Food and Beverage Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Ajinomoto del Perú S.A. in 2026.
Incidents vs Food and Beverage Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Compass Group in 2026.
Incident History - Ajinomoto del Perú S.A. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Ajinomoto del Perú S.A. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Compass Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Compass Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Ajinomoto del Perú S.A.

Compass Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.