Comparison Overview
Aero Cargas as agent of DHL Global Forwarding

Aero Cargas as agent of DHL Global Forwarding
Buenos Aires 282, Montevideo, Montevideo, 11000, UY
Last Update: 23/01/2026
Agente exclusivo de DHL Global Forwarding desde 1993 Una compañía orientada en las necesidades específicas de cada cliente, basada en la innovación y el mejoramiento continuo en la calidad de cada uno de sus servicios. Nuestras oficinas están en Montevideo (capital de ...

DP World
Jafza 17 Mina Jebel Ali, Dubai, Jebel Ali, AE
Last Update: 03/04/2026
Trade is the lifeblood of the global economy, creating opportunities and improving the quality of life for people around the world. DP World exists to make the world’s trade flow better, changing what’s possible for the customers and communities we serve globally. W...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Aero Cargas as agent of DHL Global Forwarding







DP World






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Transportation, Logistics, Supply Chain and Storage Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Aero Cargas as agent of DHL Global Forwarding in 2026.
Incidents vs Transportation, Logistics, Supply Chain and Storage Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for DP World in 2026.
Incident History - Aero Cargas as agent of DHL Global Forwarding (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Aero Cargas as agent of DHL Global Forwarding cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - DP World (X = Date, Y = Severity)
DP World cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Aero Cargas as agent of DHL Global Forwarding

DP World
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Fides is an open-source privacy engineering platform. From version 2.33.0 to before version 2.84.5, there is a DOM-based XSS vulnerability in fides.js via the fides_description override. This issue has been patched in version 2.84.5.
WACRM prior to commit 73041bf contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in the automation engine that allows authenticated attackers to access and modify contacts belonging to other tenants by supplying an arbitrary caller-controlled contact_id in the POST request body without tenant ownership verification. Attackers can exploit the service-role client that bypasses row-level security to modify victim contact fields including name, email, and company across tenant boundaries using only a known contact UUID.
Namespace attributes are not encoded correctly during HTML serialization. This allows bypassing the cross-site scripting prevention mechanism of typo3/html-sanitizer before version 2.3.2.
When ALLOW_INSECURE_RAW_TEXT is enabled, whitespace-variant closing tags (e.g., </style\t>) are not recognized by the sanitizer but accepted by browsers as valid end tags, allowing subsequent content to escape sanitization. This allows bypassing the cross-site scripting prevention mechanism of typo3/html-sanitizer before version 2.3.2.
Headplane is a feature-complete Web UI for Headscale. Prior to versions 0.6.3 and 0.7.0-beta.3, Headplane was vulnerable to a path traversal / authorization bypass in the Headscale API client used by node and user rename operations. This issue has been patched in versions 0.6.3 and 0.7.0-beta.3.