Comparison Overview
AECOM Program Management

AECOM Program Management
13355 Noel Rd, Dallas, Texas, 75240, US
Last Update: 25/12/2025
At AECOM, we’re united by a common purpose of delivering a better world. Our global program management business provides the structure, tools, techniques and process to deliver on this vision. By connecting our expertise across services, markets, and geographies, we man...

Skanska
Warfvinges väg 25 (Group Headquarters), Stockholm, SE, SE-112 74
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Skanska Group uses knowledge & foresight to shape the way people live, work, and connect. More than 138 years in the making, we’re one of the world’s largest development and construction companies, with 2024 revenue totaling SEK 177 billion. We operate in select markets...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

AECOM Program Management







Skanska






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for AECOM Program Management in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Skanska in 2026.
Incident History - AECOM Program Management (X = Date, Y = Severity)
AECOM Program Management cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Skanska (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Skanska cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

AECOM Program Management

Skanska
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
In OpenStack Ironic before 38.0.1, the autodetect deploy interface may fail to run cleaning immediately after enrollment with, or changing to, the autodetect deploy interface.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. A user with FEATURE_BUILD_SUPPORT enabled and repository write access can exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability within the build API. This allows the user to provide a malicious URL, causing the Quay builder to make requests to internal network addresses. Such an action could lead to the disclosure of sensitive internal information.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's exported logs feature. An unauthenticated attacker with a valid file ID could download exported action logs without proper authorization. While file IDs are complex, they can be intercepted from plaintext email or webhook callbacks. This vulnerability leads to information disclosure, potentially exposing sensitive data such as usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, and action-specific metadata.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay's Stripe billing webhook handler. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated attacker to forge billing events by sending crafted JSON requests to the `/webhooks/stripe` endpoint without validating the Stripe-Signature header. Successful exploitation can lead to the unauthorized resetting of a namespace's build quota to its maximum and trigger unsolicited billing emails to namespace administrators.
A flaw was found in Red Hat Quay. When the SECURITY_SCANNER_V4_PSK (pre-shared key) is not set, a remote unauthenticated attacker can send POST requests to the security scanner notification endpoint. This allows the attacker to flood the notification queue and inject path traversal characters into Clair API URL paths. The primary consequence is worker resource exhaustion and blind path manipulation on the configured Clair host, potentially leading to a denial of service.