Comparison Overview
Advanced Pipes and Casts

Advanced Pipes and Casts
Messaied Industrial Area, Doha, QA
Last Update: 30/04/2026
APC Established in 2010 and one of the leading pipe manufacturers in the Middle East. The Company’s extensive production capacity is largely automated and has the flexibility to respond swiftly to changes in end-market demand. The product range includes circular precast...

Future Group India
Tower C, 24/7 Park,, Mumbai, 400083, IN
Last Update: 04/09/2026
About Working with Future Group gives you an opportunity to be part of a family with a unique culture and beliefs. Drawing from the vision of modern Indian retail, we have built a company that our people are proud of and our customers and communities value. Missio...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Advanced Pipes and Casts







Future Group India






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Advanced Pipes and Casts in 2026.
Incidents vs Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Future Group India in 2026.
Incident History - Advanced Pipes and Casts (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Advanced Pipes and Casts cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Future Group India (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Future Group India cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Advanced Pipes and Casts

Future Group India
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.