Comparison Overview
ADT
ADT
1501 Yamato Road, Boca Raton, 33431, US
Last Update: 12/06/2026
ADT is the most trusted name in smart home security, helping protect and connect what matters most at home and beyond. When Every Second Counts, Count on ADT 💙.
Great Clips Inc.
4400 W. 78th St., Minneapolis, 55435, US
Last Update: 14/09/2026
Established in Minneapolis in 1982, Great Clips has grown to be the world's largest and fastest growing salon brand. There are more than 4,400 salons throughout the United States and Canada -- all of them owned by franchisees. Visit us at www.greatclips.com Employment ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
ADT
Great Clips Inc.
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Consumer Services Industry Avg (This Year)
ADT has 529.92% more incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Consumer Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Great Clips Inc. in 2026.
Incident History - ADT (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ADT cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Great Clips Inc. (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Great Clips Inc. cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
ADT
Great Clips Inc.
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to exposure of session tokens in the HTML response.
IBM TRIRIGA Application Platform 5.0.0 through 5.0.8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to an XML external entity (XXE) injection flaw.
IBM Aspera Enterprise WebApps 1.0.0 through 1.0.6 could allow a local attacker to obtain sensitive information due to cleartext transmission of sensitive information.
IBM Planning Analytics 2.0, and 2.1 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to a stack-based buffer overflow.
IBM DataStage on Cloud Pak for Data 5.4.0.0 can allow a man-in-the-middle attacker to present a forged TLS certificate, intercept the connection, and capture the IAM bearer Authorization header automatically attached by the session adapter. The captured token grants full platform-scope tenant API access, enabling the attacker to read and manipulate the victim's DataStage projects, flows, assets, and pipeline definitions. This is client-side SDK code running on the user's own machine, so exploitation requires an external network interceptor rather than a co-tenant in the shared cluster.