Comparison Overview
ADMV – product handling machinery & robotics

ADMV – product handling machinery & robotics
ZA Les Triboullières 490 rue Robert Berthelet, Crémieu, undefined, 38 460, FR
Last Update: 26/12/2025
ADMV is based in Crémieu, near Lyon in France. The ADMV team designs and manufactures robotic applications and feeding machines, including bulk feeders, step elevators, handling and assembly machines. The machines ensure gentle product handling, avoid unnecessary accumu...

Bilfinger
Oskar-Meixner-Straße 1, Mannheim, 68163, DE
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Bilfinger is an international industrial services provider with a vision to be the No. 1 for its customers in enhancing efficiency and sustainability within the process industry. Bilfinger’s comprehensive portfolio spans the entire value chain, from consulting & enginee...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ADMV – product handling machinery & robotics







Bilfinger






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ADMV – product handling machinery & robotics in 2026.
Incidents vs Industrial Machinery Manufacturing Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Bilfinger in 2026.
Incident History - ADMV – product handling machinery & robotics (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ADMV – product handling machinery & robotics cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Bilfinger (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Bilfinger cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ADMV – product handling machinery & robotics

Bilfinger
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras certificate-related upload interfaces allow authenticated users to store arbitrary file content to fixed, persistent filesystem locations without validating file type, structure, or size. This design omission enables the placement of unexpected or malformed data in locations intended for trusted certificate material, which could affect system integrity or behavior even after reboot.
A vulnerability exists in H.View IP cameras that could allow an authenticated user to supply unsanitized XML fields to the device's certificate generation interface, which are incorporated into a backend certificate creation command without proper input validation. This may allow for command execution with elevated privileges during certificate generation.
The DMP-5000 file service exposes authenticated arbitrary file upload functionality. There are exposed endpoints which allows authenticated users to upload files of any type without validation. No file extension filtering or content inspection is enforced which allows executable binaries and scripts to be accepted and written directly to the server.
The DMP-5000 devices are shipped with a default administrative web account with weak authentication controls, which are not required to be changed during initial configuration or operation. Using these accounts provides full system access.
Various versions of Daktronics Controller Firmware could allow authenticated and unauthenticated remote users to escape the intended directory and enumerate arbitrary file system paths.