Comparison Overview
ADMAN GROUP

ADMAN GROUP
4 Bankmore Way East,, Omagh, +44 (0)28 8224 2166, BT79 0NZ, GB
Last Update: 09/12/2025
The Adman group of companies is a leading provider of civil engineering and construction services with a proven track record of service delivery for both public and private sector clients with operations in Renewable Energy, Utilities (Electrical), Infrastructure (Road ...

Fugro
Veurse Achterweg 10, Leidschendam, 2264 SG, NL
Last Update: 01/04/2026
We are the world’s leading Geo-data specialist, collecting and analysing comprehensive information about the Earth and the structures built upon it. Through integrated data acquisition, analysis and advice, we unlock insights from Geo-data to help our clients design, bu...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ADMAN GROUP







Fugro






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Civil Engineering Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ADMAN GROUP in 2026.
Incidents vs Civil Engineering Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Fugro in 2026.
Incident History - ADMAN GROUP (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ADMAN GROUP cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Fugro (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Fugro cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ADMAN GROUP

Fugro
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
FileBrowser Quantum is a free, self-hosted, web-based file manager. Versions prior to 1.3.2-stable, 1.4.0-beta and 1.4.1-beta are vulnerable to Path Traversal through the publicPatchHandler in backend/http/public.go which joins user-controlled fromPath and toPath body fields with the trusted d.share.Path BEFORE the downstream sanitizer runs. Because filepath.Join collapses .. segments during the join, the sanitizer in resourcePatchHandler never sees the traversal and the move/copy/rename operates on a path outside the shared directory. The same root-cause pattern was patched for the bulk DELETE endpoint as CVE-2026-44542 (GHSA-fwj3-42wh-8673), but the PATCH handler with the identical pattern was not updated. A public share link with AllowModify=true is sufficient to exploit this. Anyone holding such a link can move, copy, or rename arbitrary files within the share owner's source root. This issue has been fixed in versions 1.3.3-stable and 1.4.2-beta.
stable-diffusion.cpp is a pure C/C++ library for running diffusion model (Stable Diffusion, Flux, Wan, Qwen Image, Z-Image, and more) inference. In versions prior to master-584-0a7ae07, the pickle .ckpt parser in src/model.cpp contained a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in the GLOBAL opcode handler. The issue was caused by missing validation when searching for newline-delimited fields. A crafted .ckpt file without the expected newline could cause the parser to use -1 as a copy length, resulting in immediate heap corruption. The attack requires the victim or application to load a .ckpt file from an untrusted source, such as a downloaded model from a model sharing site. The issue has been resolved in version master-584-0a7ae07. If developers are unable to immediately update their applications they can work around this issue by following these instructions: do not load .ckpt checkpoint files from untrusted sources, and prefer trusted model sources and safer formats such as .safetensors where possible.
stable-diffusion.cpp is a pure C/C++ library for running diffusion model (Stable Diffusion, Flux, Wan, Qwen Image, Z-Image, and more) inference. In versions prior to master-584-0a7ae07, the pickle .ckpt parser in src/model.cpp contained a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in the BINUNICODE opcode handler. The issue was caused by sign confusion on the opcode length field. A crafted .ckpt file could trigger memcpy with a very large length derived from a negative signed value, causing immediate heap corruption. The issue has been resolved in version master-584-0a7ae07. If developers are unable to immediately update their applications they can work around this issue by only loading .ckpt checkpoint files from trusted sources and preferring trusted model sources and safer formats such as .safetensors where possible.
In OpenStack Nova before 33.0.2, the server create API does not strip certain hint data. The resulting instance has no Placement allocation.
The device has a webserver that exposes a REST API authenticated with a token on the management network. By exploiting an OS command injection vulnerability an authenticated attacker can send arbitrary commands to the device that are executed with administrative permissions by the underlying operating system.