Comparison Overview
ADB Partnerships

ADB Partnerships
6 ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong, 1550, PH
Last Update: 16/02/2026
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) cannot fight poverty in Asia and the Pacific by itself. ADB and its financing partners pool financial resources, share in the risks involved, and combine knowledge and technical expertise in planning and implementing a development prog...

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH
Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 32+36, Bonn, 53113, DE
Last Update: 01/04/2026
As a service provider in the field of international cooperation for sustainable development and international education work, we are dedicated to shaping a future worth living around the world. GIZ has over 50 years of experience in a wide variety of areas, including ec...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ADB Partnerships







Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs International Trade and Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ADB Partnerships in 2026.
Incidents vs International Trade and Development Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH in 2026.
Incident History - ADB Partnerships (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ADB Partnerships cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ADB Partnerships

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.