Comparison Overview
ACO Webinar Academy

ACO Webinar Academy
Gewerbestraße 14-20, Baden, 2500, AT
Last Update: 28/12/2025
Weiterbildung ist bei ACO nun so einfach wie nie zuvor – online und bequem vom Arbeitsplatz oder von zu Hause aus. Unsere Webinars sollen helfen, die Herausforderungen bei Planung, Einbau und Wartung zu meistern. Das Weiterbildungsangebot wird, basierend auf Ihren Rück...

Owens Corning
World Headquarters, Toledo, 43659, US
Last Update: 19/09/2026
Owens Corning is a building products leader committed to building a sustainable future through material innovation. Our products provide durable, sustainable, energy-efficient solutions that leverage our unique capabilities and market-leading positions to help our custo...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ACO Webinar Academy







Owens Corning






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Wholesale Building Materials Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ACO Webinar Academy in 2026.
Incidents vs Wholesale Building Materials Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Owens Corning in 2026.
Incident History - ACO Webinar Academy (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ACO Webinar Academy cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Owens Corning (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Owens Corning cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ACO Webinar Academy

Owens Corning
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.