Comparison Overview
ACO Italia

ACO Italia
Via Beviera 41, Bagnolo in Piano, Reggio Emilia, 42011, IT
Last Update: 24/12/2025
Il Gruppo ACO, di cui Aco Passavant Spa è succursale italiana, è il principale produttore europeo di canali in calcestruzzo polimerico, materiale innovativo e versatile che ha rivoluzionato il settore del drenaggio lineare. Presente in 40 paesi nel mondo e con 32 centri...

Hilti Group
Hilti Aktiengesellschaft, Schaan, 9494, LI
Last Update: 01/04/2026
Hilti stands for innovation and direct customer relationships. About 34,000 employees around the world, in more than 120 countries, contribute to making our customers’ work more productive, safer and more sustainable. We do this with our hardware, software and service o...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

ACO Italia







Hilti Group






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ACO Italia in 2026.
Incidents vs Construction Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Hilti Group in 2026.
Incident History - ACO Italia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ACO Italia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Hilti Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Hilti Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

ACO Italia

Hilti Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A security vulnerability has been detected in Rizwan17 inventory-management-system up to bfe78a330d01bb26b9daec5dc9ecd5c77900e03f. This affects an unknown part of the file includes/invoice_bill.php of the component Invoice Generation. Such manipulation of the argument order_date/invoice_no leads to missing authentication. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. This product takes the approach of rolling releases to provide continious delivery. Therefore, version details for affected and updated releases are not available. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
A weakness has been identified in Rizwan17 inventory-management-system up to bfe78a330d01bb26b9daec5dc9ecd5c77900e03f. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file includes/DBOperation.php of the component List Handler. This manipulation of the argument category_name/brand_name/product_name causes cross site scripting. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. This product is using a rolling release to provide continious delivery. Therefore, no version details for affected nor updated releases are available. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
Authentication Bypass via Hardcoded Master Verification Code vulnerability in Siam Ordering (siam-server) 1.0.0 allows remote unauthenticated attackers to log in as any user, merchant, or administrator.
The Bluetooth Classic (BR/EDR) L2CAP receive handler bt_l2cap_br_recv() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/l2cap_br.c dispatched inbound data PDUs based only on the destination channel ID, without checking that the target channel had reached the BT_L2CAP_CONNECTED state. A dynamic channel is assigned its RX CID and added to the connection's channel list while still in BT_L2CAP_CONNECTING (and later BT_L2CAP_CONFIG) — before configuration completes and, for PSMs that require security, before the peer is authenticated (l2cap_br_conn_req()). Because the channel is already findable by bt_l2cap_br_lookup_rx_cid() during this window, a remote peer within radio range can send a data PDU addressed to that CID and have it processed on a not-yet-established channel. The dispatch keys off channel fields (BR_CHAN(chan)->rx.mode, rx.mps) that are only initialized during configuration by l2cap_br_conf(); since channel objects are pooled and bt_l2cap_br_chan_del() does not reset rx.mode or the reassembly buffer _sdu, a reused channel can carry stale state into the CONNECTING window and route the frame into the retransmission/flow-control path (bt_l2cap_br_ret_fc_recv()) with stale parameters and a possibly stale _sdu pointer. The impact is delivery of attacker data to upper-layer protocol handlers on a half-open (and possibly unauthenticated) channel, plus operation on stale or partially initialized channel state on reused channel objects — leading to channel/link teardown (denial of service) and, in the stale-_sdu case, a dangling-pointer condition. The fix adds an explicit BR_CHAN(chan)->state < BT_L2CAP_CONNECTED guard that drops any data received before the channel is fully connected.
Pandora contains a path traversal vulnerability in its archive extraction worker. When processing a specially crafted archive or disk image, attacker-controlled file paths could be used without ensuring that the resulting destination remained within the intended extraction directory. An attacker able to submit a malicious file for analysis could use path traversal sequences or crafted paths to cause extracted content to be written outside the designated extraction directory, potentially overwriting files accessible to the Pandora worker process. Successful exploitation could result in unauthorized modification of application or system files, denial of service, and potentially further compromise depending on the permissions of the Pandora process and the files that can be overwritten. The vulnerability is addressed by resolving each extraction destination path before writing and verifying that it remains below the expected extraction directory. Extraction attempts resolving outside this directory are rejected and reported as path traversal attempts.