Comparison Overview
Aalborg Portland A/S
Aalborg Portland A/S
Rørdalsvej 44, Aalborg, 9100, DK
Last Update: 14/12/2025
Founded in 1889, Aalborg Portland is one of the largest producers of grey cement in the Nordic region and the world’s leading manufacturer of white cement. The company is at the forefront of energy-efficient production of high-quality cement at the plant in Aalborg. In ...
ASSA ABLOY Group
Klarabergsviadukten 90, Stockholm, SE-10723, SE
Last Update: 09/09/2026
Let’s create a safer and more open world – together! ASSA ABLOY is the global leader in access solutions with sales of SEK 150 billion and 63,000 employees. The Group has operations in over 70 countries and sales worldwide. ASSA ABLOY’s innovations enable safe, secure ...
Compliance Ranges Comparison
Aalborg Portland A/S
ASSA ABLOY Group
Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Wholesale Building Materials Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Aalborg Portland A/S in 2026.
Incidents vs Wholesale Building Materials Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ASSA ABLOY Group in 2026.
Incident History - Aalborg Portland A/S (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Aalborg Portland A/S cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - ASSA ABLOY Group (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ASSA ABLOY Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents
Aalborg Portland A/S
ASSA ABLOY Group
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.