Comparison Overview
A1 Telekom Austria AG

A1 Telekom Austria AG
Lasallestraße 9, Wien, 1020, AT
Last Update: 19/02/2026
A1 – Internet, Voice, TV and IT-Services from One Source A1 is Austria’s leading communications provider, encompassing more than 5.3 million mobile communications customers and over 2.1 million fixed access lines. The customers benefit from a global package of offers ...

ACN
1000 Progress Place, Concord, 28025-2449, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
ACN is the leading direct selling telecommunications and essential services provider. ACN Inc. was founded in 1993 by four entrepreneurs and is now operating in North America. ACN offers essential products and services that people use every day, while also offering a po...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

A1 Telekom Austria AG







ACN






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for A1 Telekom Austria AG in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ACN in 2026.
Incident History - A1 Telekom Austria AG (X = Date, Y = Severity)
A1 Telekom Austria AG cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - ACN (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ACN cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

A1 Telekom Austria AG

ACN
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains an incomplete authentication bypass in encryptPass.json.php that allows unauthenticated attackers to compute valid HMAC tokens using the public site URL and current time. Attackers can forge authentication tokens by computing hash_hmac with the site's base URL as the key and submit arbitrary passwords to receive encrypted hashes, enabling offline precomputation attacks against stolen password databases.
WWBN AVideo through commit 9c39d8c8 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the get_domain() and isSameDomain() functions that fail to properly validate referer origins. Attackers can forge requests from sibling subdomains or unparseable long-gTLD origins to perform administrative ObjectYPT writes including live server configuration changes.
WWBN AVideo through 30.0 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the MobileManager plugin getConfiguration endpoint that returns sensitive configuration data to unauthenticated visitors. Attackers can send an unauthenticated GET request to plugin/MobileManager/getConfiguration.json.php to obtain TLS private key file paths, socket configuration details, platform version, and debug flags enabling further targeted attacks.
WWBN AVideo fails to validate password recovery token expiration in userRecoverPassSave.json.php, allowing attackers to use expired tokens to reset account passwords indefinitely. Attackers who obtain a recovery token can use it at any time to change the target account's password and gain full account access.
WWBN AVideo (current e01e41ecc and earlier) makes three login-time security controls depend solely on the client-supplied User-Agent header. The isAVideoEncoder()/isAVideoMobileApp() checks match HTTP_USER_AGENT against a hardcoded literal ("AVideoEncoder"/"AVideoMobileApp") with no IP check or shared secret. An attacker who submits valid credentials and sets User-Agent: AVideoEncoder bypasses two-factor authentication, skips brute-force captcha escalation, and avoids being recorded in the login/device audit history. No patch is available at the time of publication.