Comparison Overview
A1 Telekom Austria AG

A1 Telekom Austria AG
Lasallestraße 9, Wien, 1020, AT
Last Update: 19/02/2026
A1 – Internet, Voice, TV and IT-Services from One Source A1 is Austria’s leading communications provider, encompassing more than 5.3 million mobile communications customers and over 2.1 million fixed access lines. The customers benefit from a global package of offers ...

ACN
1000 Progress Place, Concord, 28025-2449, US
Last Update: 01/04/2026
ACN is the leading direct selling telecommunications and essential services provider. ACN Inc. was founded in 1993 by four entrepreneurs and is now operating in North America. ACN offers essential products and services that people use every day, while also offering a po...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

A1 Telekom Austria AG







ACN






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for A1 Telekom Austria AG in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for ACN in 2026.
Incident History - A1 Telekom Austria AG (X = Date, Y = Severity)
A1 Telekom Austria AG cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - ACN (X = Date, Y = Severity)
ACN cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

A1 Telekom Austria AG

ACN
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
A security flaw has been discovered in SourceCodester Onlne Examination & Learning Management System 1.0. Affected by this vulnerability is the function pathinfo of the file /upload_files.php of the component Filename Extension. Performing a manipulation results in unrestricted upload. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The name of the affected product appears to have a typo in it.
A vulnerability was identified in SourceCodester Onlne Examination & Learning Management System 1.0. Affected is an unknown function of the file /process_lesson.php. Such manipulation of the argument user_id leads to unrestricted upload. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The name of the affected product appears to have a typo in it.
A vulnerability was determined in itsourcecode Hospital Management System 1.0. This impacts an unknown function of the file /paymentdischarge.php. This manipulation of the argument patientid causes sql injection. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized.
A vulnerability was found in itsourcecode Hospital Management System 1.0. This affects an unknown function of the file /payment.php. The manipulation of the argument patientid results in sql injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used.
Zephyr's DNS resolver detects mDNS (.local) queries in dns_resolve_name_internal() (subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c) with memcmp(strrchr(query, '.'), ".local", 7), which always reads a fixed 7 bytes from the suffix pointer. When the resolved hostname's final label is shorter than 7 bytes (e.g. names ending in .org, .com, .net, .io, or a trailing dot), the comparison reads 1-2 bytes past the string's NUL terminator. The hostname (query) is the caller-supplied name passed through the standard getaddrinfo()/dns_get_addr_info()/dns_resolve_name() path and is influenceable by operators or remote inputs (server names from configuration, parsed URLs, or app-facing interfaces). On a tightly-sized buffer with no slack (for example a userspace getaddrinfo call where the hostname is copied with k_usermode_string_alloc_copy to exactly strlen+1 bytes), the over-read crosses the allocation boundary; if that boundary is unmapped (guard page, memory-domain boundary under MPU, or an address sanitizer) the over-read faults, causing a denial of service. The over-read bytes are never returned, so there is no information disclosure. The flaw is compiled only when CONFIG_MDNS_RESOLVER is enabled, exists since v1.10.0, and is fixed by replacing the fixed-length memcmp with a NUL-safe strcmp(ptr, ".local").