Comparison Overview
4Life Research

4Life Research
9850 South 300 West, Sandy, Utah, US, 84070
Last Update: 14/03/2026
We Are The Immune System Company™ In 1998, Founders David and Bianca Lisonbee embarked on a journey to bring 4Life Transfer Factor® products to the world. Everything we do at 4Life is guided by our 4 Values: Science, Success, Service, and Satisfaction.

Purpose Brands, LLC
111 Weir Drive, Woodbury, 55125, US
Last Update: 05/09/2026
Purpose Brands, LLC provides fitness, nutrition and wellness support and services to more than 7,000 communities and millions of people around the world. We own and operate the world’s largest and most trusted portfolio of fitness, health and wellness franchise brand...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

4Life Research







Purpose Brands, LLC






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Wellness and Fitness Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for 4Life Research in 2026.
Incidents vs Wellness and Fitness Services Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Purpose Brands, LLC in 2026.
Incident History - 4Life Research (X = Date, Y = Severity)
4Life Research cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Purpose Brands, LLC (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Purpose Brands, LLC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

4Life Research

Purpose Brands, LLC
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.