Comparison Overview
1O1O Corporate Solutions

1O1O Corporate Solutions
PCCW Tower, Hong Kong, Hong Kong Hong Kong, CN
Last Update: 08/05/2026
1O1O is dedicated to empowering the digital transformation of enterprises with end-to-end integrated mobile solutions employing emerging technologies, such as 5G, Internet of Thing (IoT) and Artificial Intelligence (AI). As the forerunner in network and mobility soluti...

Telia
Stjärntorget 1, SOLNA, SE-169 94, SE
Last Update: 05/09/2026
Our 15 000 talented colleagues serve millions of customers every day in one of the world’s most connected regions. With a strong connectivity base, we’re the hub in the digital ecosystem, empowering people, companies and societies to stay in touch with everything that m...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

1O1O Corporate Solutions







Telia






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for 1O1O Corporate Solutions in 2026.
Incidents vs Telecommunications Industry Avg (This Year)
Telia has 2.91% fewer incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - 1O1O Corporate Solutions (X = Date, Y = Severity)
1O1O Corporate Solutions cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Telia (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Telia cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

1O1O Corporate Solutions

Telia
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
OpenStack Ironic through 38.0.0 may send a username and password to an unexpected remote host when Image Service is configured for HTTP(S) Basic Authentication.
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.
The administrative password is hashed using a comparatively weak, fast algorithm for the credential store backing one authentication path, and the file containing that hash is written with permissions allowing it to be read by any local user. This is inconsistent with a separate, stronger hashing algorithm used for the same password on another authentication path. A party able to read this file, including a local user or a party with access to a configuration backup, could feasibly recover the underlying password through offline computation, compromising the administrative credential across every path that accepts it.
An example environment-configuration file for a bundled inventory-management component ships with a fixed, publicly-known administrative password. A deployment that copies this example file into active configuration without running the setup routine that regenerates credentials will expose that component's administrative interface to anyone aware of the default value.
A prior update that raised a bundled HTTP client library to a version remediating known vulnerabilities was later reverted, reintroducing the earlier, vulnerable version into a log-processing component. The only code path in that component using the library issues a request to a single fixed, trusted vendor URL at initialization and does not process attacker-controlled input through the library, limiting practical exploitability of the reintroduced version in this context.