XWiki Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (XWI0133201111725)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the XWiki breach identified under incident ID XWI0133201111725.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of XWiki's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/xwiki, the number of followers: 4153, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 53 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 751 and after the incident was 748 with a difference of -3 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on XWiki and their customers.

On 28 October 2025, XWiki Project disclosed Vulnerability Exploitation, Botnet Integration and Cryptojacking issues under the banner "Widespread Exploitation of Critical XWiki Vulnerability (CVE-2025-24893)".

Cybersecurity researchers have detected a dramatic surge in exploitation attempts targeting a critical XWiki vulnerability (CVE-2025-24893), with multiple threat actors actively deploying botnets (e.g., RondoDox), cryptocurrency miners, reverse shells, and custom malware to co...

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Global XWiki servers (exact count unknown).

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like CISA KEV catalog addition (2025-10-30) and Public advisories, and began remediation that includes Urgent patching of XWiki instances, and stakeholders are being briefed through Security researcher reports and CISA KEV listing.

The case underscores how Ongoing (active exploitation as of November 2025), teams are taking away lessons such as Rapid weaponization of vulnerabilities (days between disclosure and widespread exploitation), Importance of early detection systems (e.g., VulnCheck Canary Intelligence) and Need for accelerated patching timelines for critical vulnerabilities, and recommending next steps like Immediate patching of XWiki instances to CVE-2025-24893, Monitor for indicators of compromise (IOCs) such as RondoDox User-Agent patterns and known malicious IPs and Deploy network segmentation to limit lateral movement, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering CISA KEV advisory and Security researcher warnings.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (100%), with evidence including exploitation of CVE-2025-24893 in XWiki (RCE vulnerability), and first exploited on October 28, 2025. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command-Line Interpreter: Unix Shell (T1059.004) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including commands such as cat /etc/passwd, id, whoami, and reverse shells (via AWS IPs like *18.228.3.32*) and Command-Line Interpreter: JavaScript (T1059.007) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating payload hash *03a77a556f074184b254d90e13cdd3a31efaa5a77640405e5f78aa462736acf7* (likely JS-based miner). Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Local Accounts (T1078.003) with moderate to high confidence (85%), with evidence including attempting to exfiltrate sensitive data (e.g., */etc/passwd*), and persistence mechanisms from cryptomining payloads and Server Software Component: Web Shell (T1505.003) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including reverse shells (via AWS IPs), and busyBox netcat. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including commands such as id, whoami (recon for escalation), and compromised infrastructure (e.g., QNAP/DrayTek via CVE-2023-47218). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating persistence mechanisms (implies cleanup of logs/artifacts) and Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating payload hash *03a77a556f074184b254d90e13cdd3a31efaa5a77640405e5f78aa462736acf7* (obfuscated miner). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping: /etc/passwd (T1003.008) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including attempting to exfiltrate sensitive data (e.g., */etc/passwd*), and commands such as cat /etc/passwd. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified System Information Discovery (T1082) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including commands such as id, whoami, and scanning operations (e.g., via Nuclei templates) and Network Service Discovery (T1046) with moderate to high confidence (85%), with evidence including scanning operations (e.g., via Nuclei templates), and oast.fun OAST probes. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including compromised infrastructure (e.g., QNAP/DrayTek devices), and aWS-hosted reverse shell via BusyBox netcat. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating attempting to exfiltrate sensitive data (e.g., */etc/passwd*). Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Proxy: Internal Proxy (T1090.001) with moderate to high confidence (85%), with evidence including reverse shells (via AWS IPs like *18.228.3.32*), and busyBox netcat and Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including domains such as *ospwrf10ny.anondns.net*, and user-Agent such as rondo.<value>.sh. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including attempting to exfiltrate sensitive data (e.g., */etc/passwd*), and oast.fun OAST probes. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Resource Hijacking (T1496) with high confidence (100%), with evidence including cryptocurrency miners, and payload hash *03a77a556f074184b254d90e13cdd3a31efaa5a77640405e5f78aa462736acf7* and Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating potential data breaches (weak evidence, no ransomware confirmed). Under the Reconnaissance tactic, the analysis identified Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning (T1595.002) with high confidence (100%), with evidence including scanning operations (e.g., via Nuclei templates), and automated Scanning Operators and Gather Victim Host Information: Network Sniffing (T1592.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating oast.fun OAST probes (passive recon for callbacks). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.