Areas of Practice: Business Formation, Mergers and Acquisitions CommercialTransactions and Contracts Probate and Estates Real Estate Law Real Estate Development Property Tax Disputes Eminent Domain/ Condemnation Law Oil &Gas Law
Cliff Group is a legal recruitment, coaching and consultancy business in New York led by Matthew Bersani, a former partner at Shearman & Sterling for over 20 years and Molly Cliff, a leader in the legal executive search world. Cliff Group provides bespoke advice to firms and candidates based on Matthew’s and Molly’s decades of experience at the highest levels in the legal world. We offer an “inside/outside” perspective that is unmatched in the industry. Matthew has a deep firm-side understanding of how to build a successful team of collaborative and client-focused partners. Matthew played a senior management role for decades at Shearman & Sterling until he retired earlier this year. He was elected by his partners to the firm's global board of directors, sat on the firm's global executive group, and most recently was head of the firm's global corporate finance team, the firm's largest practice group. In these capacities, he established many of the firm's strategies and lateral partner hiring initiatives. Matthew received his undergraduate degree from Princeton University and his JD from Columbia Law School. Molly, a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School, worked at Cravath and in-house at GE before joining the legal recruitment industry more than 15 years ago. She works with firms to find lawyers that will add value to their existing practices while working in a collaborative and synergistic manner. She helps candidates find firms where they can realize their full potential in an environment consistent with their own values. And she partners with financial institutions to find legal and compliance compliance professionals who can work seamlessly with the business team and other company stakeholders. Please reach out to one of us if we can help. Matthew can be reached at (212) 994-9816 or [email protected] Molly can be reached at (212) 994-9815 or [email protected]
Security & Compliance Standards Overview
No incidents recorded for Whitker & Benz PC in 2025.
No incidents recorded for Cliff Group in 2025.
Whitker & Benz PC cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
Cliff Group cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
Last 3 Security & Risk Events by Company
A vulnerability was determined in motogadget mo.lock Ignition Lock up to 20251125. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the component NFC Handler. Executing manipulation can lead to use of hard-coded cryptographic key . The physical device can be targeted for the attack. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. The exploitation appears to be difficult. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the interview attachment retrieval endpoint in the Recruitment module serves files based solely on an authenticated session and user-supplied identifiers, without verifying whether the requester has permission to access the associated interview record. Because the server does not perform any recruitment-level authorization checks, an ESS-level user with no access to recruitment workflows can directly request interview attachment URLs and receive the corresponding files. This exposes confidential interview documents—including candidate CVs, evaluations, and supporting files—to unauthorized users. The issue arises from relying on predictable object identifiers and session presence rather than validating the user’s association with the relevant recruitment process. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the application’s recruitment attachment retrieval endpoint does not enforce the required authorization checks before serving candidate files. Even users restricted to ESS-level access, who have no permission to view the Recruitment module, can directly access candidate attachment URLs. When an authenticated request is made to the attachment endpoint, the system validates the session but does not confirm that the requesting user has the necessary recruitment permissions. As a result, any authenticated user can download CVs and other uploaded documents for arbitrary candidates by issuing direct requests to the attachment endpoint, leading to unauthorized exposure of sensitive applicant data. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the application does not invalidate existing sessions when a user is disabled or when a password change occurs, allowing active session cookies to remain valid indefinitely. As a result, a disabled user, or an attacker using a compromised account, can continue to access protected pages and perform operations as long as a prior session remains active. Because the server performs no session revocation or session-store cleanup during these critical state changes, disabling an account or updating credentials has no effect on already-established sessions. This makes administrative disable actions ineffective and allows unauthorized users to retain full access even after an account is closed or a password is reset, exposing the system to prolonged unauthorized use and significantly increasing the impact of account takeover scenarios. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the password reset workflow does not enforce that the username submitted in the final reset request matches the account for which the reset process was originally initiated. After obtaining a valid reset link for any account they can receive email for, an attacker can alter the username parameter in the final reset request to target a different user. Because the system accepts the supplied username without verification, the attacker can set a new password for any chosen account, including privileged accounts, resulting in full account takeover. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
