Our firm was founded in 1919. Early on, we developed a reputation for integrity, attention to detail, and passion for our work. That was nearly a century ago, but time has only served to deepen our commitment to our craft. Criminal defense is not simply our profession, it’s our calling.
Wilson & Roe High Court Enforcement is one of the UK’s leading High Court Enforcement and Certificated Bailiff operations. We specialise in the enforcement of judgment debt and regaining control of property and assets. Working for a range of businesses, including law firms, lenders, local authorities, landlords and property agents, we are completely focused on achieving maximum results at minimum further cost. Strongly committed to delivering the best service and results in the industry, we obtain payment in full and resolve more cases quicker than any other High Court Enforcement Office. Over the years, we have expanded from our home in Salford, Manchester to open additional offices in Leeds, Birmingham, Bristol and London, serving all major cities and beyond. Our principle services include: - Money judgment enforcement - Removal of trespassers - Tenant evictions & mortgage repossessions - Waste removal & cleaning - Commercial rent arrears recovery - Commercial lease forfeiture Why choose to work with Wilson & Roe? Our mission has always been to be the best at what we do. We set our expectations high to ensure we deliver consistently well on each instruction. We achieve this, principally, through our strong investment in our people. At Wilson & Roe we go to great lengths to attract, develop, engage and retain the best in our field of expertise, because that’s what makes us great. We believe that when you instruct Wilson & Roe you are entrusting us with your reputation and our approach to enforcement is in keeping with the ethos of our clients and is reflective of our professional and social responsibilities.
Security & Compliance Standards Overview
No incidents recorded for Voyles Vaiana Lukemeyer Baldwin & Webb in 2025.
No incidents recorded for Wilson & Roe High Court Enforcement in 2025.
Voyles Vaiana Lukemeyer Baldwin & Webb cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
Wilson & Roe High Court Enforcement cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
Last 3 Security & Risk Events by Company
A vulnerability was determined in motogadget mo.lock Ignition Lock up to 20251125. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the component NFC Handler. Executing manipulation can lead to use of hard-coded cryptographic key . The physical device can be targeted for the attack. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. The exploitation appears to be difficult. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the interview attachment retrieval endpoint in the Recruitment module serves files based solely on an authenticated session and user-supplied identifiers, without verifying whether the requester has permission to access the associated interview record. Because the server does not perform any recruitment-level authorization checks, an ESS-level user with no access to recruitment workflows can directly request interview attachment URLs and receive the corresponding files. This exposes confidential interview documents—including candidate CVs, evaluations, and supporting files—to unauthorized users. The issue arises from relying on predictable object identifiers and session presence rather than validating the user’s association with the relevant recruitment process. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the application’s recruitment attachment retrieval endpoint does not enforce the required authorization checks before serving candidate files. Even users restricted to ESS-level access, who have no permission to view the Recruitment module, can directly access candidate attachment URLs. When an authenticated request is made to the attachment endpoint, the system validates the session but does not confirm that the requesting user has the necessary recruitment permissions. As a result, any authenticated user can download CVs and other uploaded documents for arbitrary candidates by issuing direct requests to the attachment endpoint, leading to unauthorized exposure of sensitive applicant data. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the application does not invalidate existing sessions when a user is disabled or when a password change occurs, allowing active session cookies to remain valid indefinitely. As a result, a disabled user, or an attacker using a compromised account, can continue to access protected pages and perform operations as long as a prior session remains active. Because the server performs no session revocation or session-store cleanup during these critical state changes, disabling an account or updating credentials has no effect on already-established sessions. This makes administrative disable actions ineffective and allows unauthorized users to retain full access even after an account is closed or a password is reset, exposing the system to prolonged unauthorized use and significantly increasing the impact of account takeover scenarios. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the password reset workflow does not enforce that the username submitted in the final reset request matches the account for which the reset process was originally initiated. After obtaining a valid reset link for any account they can receive email for, an attacker can alter the username parameter in the final reset request to target a different user. Because the system accepts the supplied username without verification, the attacker can set a new password for any chosen account, including privileged accounts, resulting in full account takeover. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
