Timor Telecom Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (THEINGDEPCIRTIM1769124673)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Timor Telecom breach identified under incident ID THEINGDEPCIRTIM1769124673.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Timor Telecom's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/timor-telecom, the number of followers: 1342, the industry type: Telecommunications and the number of employees: 246 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 755 and after the incident was 741 with a difference of -14 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Timor Telecom and their customers.

On 01 August 2025, U.S. Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) disclosed Data Breach, Phishing and Ransomware issues under the banner "Weekly Cybersecurity Breach Roundup: DOGE Data Exposure, CIRO Phishing Attack, and Rising Threats".

This week’s cybersecurity landscape saw multiple high-profile incidents, including unauthorized data sharing by the U.S.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Cloudflare server, CIRO systems and Ingram Micro systems, and exposing Social Security data, Personal Identifiable Information (PII) and Investment account details, with nearly ['750,000 (CIRO)', '42,521 (Ingram Micro)', '23 million (SK Telecom)'] records at risk, plus an estimated financial loss of $91 million (proposed fine for SK Telecom).

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Ingram Micro took systems offline and SK Telecom offered free USIM replacements, and began remediation that includes Chainlit released patches for CVE-2026-22218 and CVE-2026-22219, while recovery efforts such as Ingram Micro restored operations by July 9, 2025 continue, and stakeholders are being briefed through CIRO disclosed breach in August 2025 and SK Telecom contested fine.

The case underscores how Ongoing (DOGE, SK Telecom, CIRO), and recommending next steps like Strengthen DDoS defenses (traffic filtering, WAFs, rate-limiting), Patch critical vulnerabilities promptly (e.g., Chainlit) and Avoid unauthorized cloud storage for sensitive data, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering UK NCSC advised organizations to strengthen DDoS defenses.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing (T1566) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating cIRO disclosed a phishing attack in August 2025, Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating chainlit vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-22218, CVE-2026-22219) exploited, and Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools (T1195.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating north Korean hackers abused Microsoft VS Code for malware delivery. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating victims tricked into opening malicious Git repositories in VS Code and Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating attacker-controlled commands executed via VS Code projects. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating dOGE employee accessed Numident database despite revoked access. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating dOGE employee accessed restricted SSA databases. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories (T1564.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating dOGE employee sent encrypted file believed to contain PII and Masquerading (T1036) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating malicious Git repositories disguised as legitimate VS Code projects. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Brute Force (T1110) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating phishing attack on CIRO may have led to credential harvesting and Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating coinbaseCartel claimed theft of AWS keys via Bitbucket (SK Telecom). Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery (T1087) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating dOGE accessed Numident database containing SSA applications and Network Service Discovery (T1046) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating chainlit SSRF vulnerability enabled probing of internal networks. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating 3.5 TB of data stolen from Ingram Micro; SSA data uploaded to Cloudflare and Data from Information Repositories (T1213) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating dOGE accessed Numident database; CIRO investor data compromised. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol (T1071) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating north Korean hackers used Vercel for C2 infrastructure. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Web Service (T1567) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating sSA data uploaded to unauthorized Cloudflare server by DOGE and Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating 3.5 TB of data exfiltrated by SafePay gang (Ingram Micro). Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating safePay ransomware encrypted Ingram Micro data, Defacement (T1491) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating dDoS attacks by NoName057(16) may include defacement, and Endpoint Denial of Service (T1499) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating noName057(16) conducted DDoS attacks on UK organizations. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.