We are the UK's largest woodland conservation charity. Our vision is a world where woods and trees thrive for people and nature.
Every day, we help millions of people to make journeys across London: By Tube, bus, tram, car, bike – and more. People don’t associate us with journeys by river, on foot or via the air, but we help with that, too. Getting people to where they need to go has been our business for over 100 years, and it shows. We’re leaders in our field, and no other city’s transport system is quite as recognisable: Red buses, black taxis, Tube trains and roundels have become icons in their own right. Our main job is to keep the city moving, working and growing but to do that, we have to listen. Constant improvements across the network are fuelled by feedback and comments from customers, as well as work within communities, representative groups, businesses and other London transport stakeholders. But our progress also depends on technology and data. With the future at our fingertips, we’ve already used it to revolutionise travel payments (think Oyster and contactless payment cards), and improved travel information. Tech and data is essential, not just to our future, but to others’: third parties use our data to power apps and services vital to customer journeys. So what’s next? As well as continuing to deliver Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan’s strategy and commitments on transport, our programme of capital investments is still one of the largest. We launched the Elizabeth line, we’re modernising services and stations and making travel safer for all.
Security & Compliance Standards Overview
No incidents recorded for The Woodland Trust in 2025.
Transport for London has 163.16% more incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
The Woodland Trust cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
Transport for London cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
Last 3 Security & Risk Events by Company
n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Prior to version 2.0.0, in self-hosted n8n instances where the Code node runs in legacy (non-task-runner) JavaScript execution mode, authenticated users with workflow editing access can invoke internal helper functions from within the Code node. This allows a workflow editor to perform actions on the n8n host with the same privileges as the n8n process, including: reading files from the host filesystem (subject to any file-access restrictions configured on the instance and OS/container permissions), and writing files to the host filesystem (subject to the same restrictions). This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0. Workarounds for this issue involve limiting file operations by setting N8N_RESTRICT_FILE_ACCESS_TO to a dedicated directory (e.g., ~/.n8n-files) and ensure it contains no sensitive data, keeping N8N_BLOCK_FILE_ACCESS_TO_N8N_FILES=true (default) to block access to .n8n and user-defined config files, and disabling high-risk nodes (including the Code node) using NODES_EXCLUDE if workflow editors are not fully trusted.
n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. From version 1.0.0 to before 2.0.0, a sandbox bypass vulnerability exists in the Python Code Node that uses Pyodide. An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary commands on the host system running n8n, using the same privileges as the n8n process. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0. Workarounds for this issue involve disabling the Code Node by setting the environment variable NODES_EXCLUDE: "[\"n8n-nodes-base.code\"]", disabling Python support in the Code node by setting the environment variable N8N_PYTHON_ENABLED=false, which was introduced in n8n version 1.104.0, and configuring n8n to use the task runner based Python sandbox via the N8N_RUNNERS_ENABLED and N8N_NATIVE_PYTHON_RUNNER environment variables.
LMDeploy is a toolkit for compressing, deploying, and serving LLMs. Prior to version 0.11.1, an insecure deserialization vulnerability exists in lmdeploy where torch.load() is called without the weights_only=True parameter when loading model checkpoint files. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the victim's machine when they load a malicious .bin or .pt model file. This issue has been patched in version 0.11.1.
n8n is an open source workflow automation platform. Prior to version 1.114.0, a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability may occur in n8n when using the “Respond to Webhook” node. When this node responds with HTML content containing executable scripts, the payload may execute directly in the top-level window, rather than within the expected sandbox introduced in version 1.103.0. This behavior can enable a malicious actor with workflow creation permissions to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the n8n editor interface. This issue has been patched in version 1.114.0. Workarounds for this issue involve restricting workflow creation and modification privileges to trusted users only, avoiding use of untrusted HTML responses in the “Respond to Webhook” node, and using an external reverse proxy or HTML sanitizer to filter responses that include executable scripts.
Yealink T21P_E2 Phone 52.84.0.15 is vulnerable to Directory Traversal. A remote normal privileged attacker can read arbitrary files via a crafted request result read function of the diagnostic component.
