"Output Messenger", the leading Secure and Private Instant Messaging Solution for all businesses. Give your team the freedom to chat, talk, share and interact together from anywhere, on any devices."
A global leader in optimizing the customer experience lifecycle, digital transformation, and business process management, HGS is helping its clients become more competitive every day. HGS combines automation, analytics, and artificial intelligence with deep domain expertise focusing on digital customer experiences, back-office processing, contact centers, and HRO solutions. Part of the multi-billion-dollar conglomerate Hinduja Group, HGS takes a “globally local” approach with over 18,000+ employees across 38 delivery centers in 9 countries.
Security & Compliance Standards Overview
No incidents recorded for Output Messenger in 2026.
No incidents recorded for HGS in 2026.
Output Messenger cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
HGS cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
Last 3 Security & Risk Events by Company
Improper validation of specified type of input in M365 Copilot allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network.
Improper access control in Azure Front Door (AFD) allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
Azure Entra ID Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
Moonraker is a Python web server providing API access to Klipper 3D printing firmware. In versions 0.9.3 and below, instances configured with the "ldap" component enabled are vulnerable to LDAP search filter injection techniques via the login endpoint. The 401 error response message can be used to determine whether or not a search was successful, allowing for brute force methods to discover LDAP entries on the server such as user IDs and user attributes. This issue has been fixed in version 0.10.0.
Runtipi is a Docker-based, personal homeserver orchestrator that facilitates multiple services on a single server. Versions 3.7.0 and above allow an authenticated user to execute arbitrary system commands on the host server by injecting shell metacharacters into backup filenames. The BackupManager fails to sanitize the filenames of uploaded backups. The system persists user-uploaded files directly to the host filesystem using the raw originalname provided in the request. This allows an attacker to stage a file containing shell metacharacters (e.g., $(id).tar.gz) at a predictable path, which is later referenced during the restore process. The successful storage of the file is what allows the subsequent restore command to reference and execute it. This issue has been fixed in version 4.7.0.
