SitusAMC Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (SIT3233032112625)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the SitusAMC breach identified under incident ID SIT3233032112625.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of SitusAMC's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/situsamc, the number of followers: 52264, the industry type: Real Estate and the number of employees: 4500 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 719 and after the incident was 646 with a difference of -73 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on SitusAMC and their customers.

On 22 November 2025, SitusAMC disclosed Data Breach and Third-Party Breach issues under the banner "SitusAMC Cyber Attack Exposes US Banks' Loan and Mortgage Data".

SitusAMC, a tech supplier providing loans and mortgage services to US banks (including JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup), suffered a cyber attack resulting in the compromise of 'certain information' from its systems.

The disruption is felt across the environment, and exposing Accounting Records, Legal Agreements and Clients' Customer Data.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, and began remediation that includes Data review process with keyword searches to identify impacted clients, and stakeholders are being briefed through Public statements on 2025-11-22 and 2025-11-25.

The case underscores how Ongoing (data review phase with keyword searches), teams are taking away lessons such as Third-party fintech partners introduce significant risk to financial institutions, with 96% of EU financial firms affected by third-party breaches (per SecurityScorecard), Attackers are shifting toward quiet data extraction over disruptive attacks, complicating detection and Continuous visibility into vendor ecosystems and real-time validation of partner controls are critical, and recommending next steps like Financial institutions must elevate partner risk management to the level of internal security, Implement continuous monitoring of third/fourth-party vendors (as mandated by regulations like the EU's Digital Operational Resilience Act) and Assume all non-public data shared with partners is a potential exposure point.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Trusted Relationship (T1199) with moderate to high confidence (85%), with evidence including third-party supplier security vulnerabilities in financial services ecosystem, and third-party fintech partners introduce significant risk. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including compromised corporate data (accounting records, legal agreements), and clients customer data impacted and Data from Network Shared Drive (T1039) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating high-value targets such as Loan/Mortgage Documents, Accounting Records, Legal Agreements. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including stealthy data exfiltration prioritized over immediate disruption, and data exfiltration such as true in ransomware section and Automated Exfiltration: Traffic Duplication (T1020.001) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating keyword searches to identify impacted client data suggests structured extraction. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating shift toward quiet data extraction over disruptive attacks implies log/trace cleanup and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate confidence (65%), supported by evidence indicating no detection until 2025-11-12 despite likely earlier compromise. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Destruction (T1485) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration such as true (no confirmation of destruction, but potential secondary impact) and Resource Hijacking (T1496) with lower confidence (40%), supported by evidence indicating operational impact such as Ongoing data review suggests resource drain. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: SSH (T1021.004) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating interconnected financial services ecosystem implies internal network traversal. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.