PcComponentes Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (ZENPCC1769030611)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the PcComponentes breach identified under incident ID ZENPCC1769030611.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of PcComponentes's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/pccomponentes, the number of followers: 46732, the industry type: Computers and Electronics Manufacturing and the number of employees: 651 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 759 and after the incident was 656 with a difference of -103 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on PcComponentes and their customers.

PcComponentes recently reported "PcComponentes Credential Stuffing Attack", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

PcComponentes denied a major data breach but confirmed a credential stuffing attack exposed sensitive account details of customers.

The disruption is felt across the environment, and exposing Order histories, physical addresses, full names, phone numbers, IP addresses, product wishlists, customer support messages, national ID numbers, email addresses, with nearly 500,000 leaked (16.3 million claimed) records at risk.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Invalidated active sessions, forced re-authentication, and began remediation that includes Implemented CAPTCHA protections, mandatory two-factor authentication (2FA) for all accounts.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Importance of enforcing multi-factor authentication (2FA) and monitoring for credential reuse from previous breaches, and recommending next steps like Enforce 2FA for all accounts, implement CAPTCHA protections, monitor for credential stuffing attacks, and educate users on password hygiene, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Forced re-authentication with 2FA enabled, CAPTCHA protections implemented.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Local Accounts (T1078.003) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including credential stuffing attack exposed sensitive account details, and reused login credentials from previous breaches and Brute Force: Credential Stuffing (T1110.004) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating attack stemmed from credential stuffing where attackers used reused login credentials. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating compromised credentials traced to info-stealing malware infections and Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating customer support messages exchanged via Zendesk exposed. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating order histories, physical addresses, full names, phone numbers, IP addresses compromised and Data from Information Repositories (T1213) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating customer support messages exchanged via Zendesk exposed. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating 500,000 entries leaked and remainder offered for sale on hacker forums and Exfiltration Over Web Service (T1567) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration and sale on dark web. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token (T1550.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating attackers used reused login credentials to access accounts. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Destruction (T1485) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating invalidated active sessions, forcing users to re-authenticate and Account Access Removal (T1531) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating invalidated active sessions, forced re-authentication with 2FA. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.