Oracle Cloud SCM Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (THEINGSALJAGORASYNDAV1769095448)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Oracle Cloud SCM breach identified under incident ID THEINGSALJAGORASYNDAV1769095448.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Oracle Cloud SCM's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/oracle-cloud-scm, the number of followers: 11080, the industry type: Information Technology & Services and the number of employees: 1 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 751 and after the incident was 453 with a difference of -298 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Oracle Cloud SCM and their customers.

Salesforce Ecosystem recently reported "Ransomware in 2025: A Systemic Threat Disrupting Global Supply Chains and Critical Services", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

In 2025, ransomware evolved from isolated IT disruptions into a systemic risk, threatening national supply chains, essential services, and entire industries.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting SaaS platforms, IT distribution networks and Healthcare infrastructure, and exposing True, plus an estimated financial loss of $275 billion annually by 2031 (projected global cost).

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how teams are taking away lessons such as Ransomware has evolved into a systemic risk with cascading impacts on supply chains, critical services, and industries. Initial access often relies on stolen credentials or social engineering, and supply chain vulnerabilities amplify the impact. Data theft and operational paralysis are primary damage drivers, with delayed consequences such as regulatory penalties or human harm.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating initial access frequently relied on stolen credentials, Phishing (T1566) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating social engineering as a key initial access vector, and Supply Chain Compromise (T1195) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating supply chain vulnerabilities amplified impact, SaaS supply chain blind spots exploited. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution (T1204) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating social engineering implies user interaction to execute payloads. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating stolen credentials likely used for persistent access. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating stolen credentials may have been used to escalate privileges. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating stolen credentials used to blend in with legitimate activity and Hide Artifacts (T1564) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware attacks often employ evasion techniques to avoid detection. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials (T1552) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating stolen credentials as a primary initial access vector and Brute Force (T1110) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating possible credential stuffing or brute force in absence of MFA. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery (T1087) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating likely discovery of high-value accounts post-initial access and File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware typically scans for files to encrypt or exfiltrate. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services (T1021) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating stolen credentials used to move laterally across networks and Lateral Tool Transfer (T1570) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware payloads likely transferred across systems. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating data theft and exfiltration confirmed in ransomware incidents and Data from Network Shared Drive (T1039) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating likely collection from shared drives during lateral movement. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol (T1071) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware typically uses C2 channels for coordination. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration confirmed as primary damage driver and Exfiltration Over Web Service (T1567) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating possible use of cloud services for data exfiltration. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating data encryption confirmed in ransomware attacks, Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware often disables recovery mechanisms, Defacement (T1491) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating possible defacement or ransom notes displayed, and Endpoint Denial of Service (T1499) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating operational paralysis and downtime confirmed. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.