Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (MIN1766174208)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation breach identified under incident ID MIN1766174208.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/ministry-of-defense-of-the-russian-federation, the number of followers: 751, the industry type: Public Policy and the number of employees: 623 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 760 and after the incident was 741 with a difference of -19 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and their customers.

On 19 December 2023, a cybersecurity incident called "Cyber-Espionage Campaign Targeting Russian Defense and Technology Firms" came to light.

Russian defense and technology firms were targeted in a cyber-espionage campaign linked to the 'Paper Werewolf' (GOFFEE) hacking group, believed to be pro-Ukrainian.

The disruption is felt across the environment, and exposing Technical data related to air defense and sensitive electronics.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how Ongoing.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing (T1566) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including aI-generated decoy documents to trick employees, and fake concert invitation for high-ranking officers and Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including malicious files in decoy documents, and correspondence mimicking Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution (T1204) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating employees opening malicious files in decoy documents. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating gathering intelligence on Russian defense capabilities. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (75%), with evidence including cyber-espionage campaign targeting technical data, and disruption of systems at Gaskar Integration. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Masquerading (T1036) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating aI-generated decoy documents mimicking legitimate correspondence. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.