Microsoft Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (MIC1692516110725)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Microsoft breach identified under incident ID MIC1692516110725.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Microsoft's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/microsoft, the number of followers: 26897413, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 220893 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 702 and after the incident was 658 with a difference of -44 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Microsoft and their customers.

On 06 November 2025, Microsoft (VS Code Marketplace) disclosed Malware, Ransomware and Supply Chain Attack issues under the banner "Malicious VS Code Extension 'susvsex' with Ransomware Capabilities and Trojanized npm Packages Distributing Vidar Infostealer".

Cybersecurity researchers discovered a malicious Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension named 'susvsex' with ransomware capabilities, likely created using AI ('vibe-coded').

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Windows (VS Code), macOS (VS Code) and Systems with infected npm packages (Windows/Linux/macOS), and exposing Files in test directories (C:\Users\Public\testing, /tmp/testing) and Potential system data via Vidar Infostealer (credentials, cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, etc.).

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Microsoft removed 'susvsex' from VS Code Marketplace (2025-11-06) and npm banned malicious accounts ('aartje', 'saliii229911') and packages, and stakeholders are being briefed through Public disclosure by researchers (Secure Annex, Datadog) and Media coverage.

The case underscores how Ongoing (C2 repository and threat actors under analysis), teams are taking away lessons such as AI-assisted ('vibe-coded') malware can bypass basic detection due to unconventional coding practices, Open-source ecosystems (VS Code, npm) remain prime targets for supply chain attacks and GitHub can be abused as a C2 infrastructure, highlighting the need for monitoring unusual repository activity, and recommending next steps like Enhance vetting processes for extensions/packages in official marketplaces (e.g., static analysis, behavioral sandboxing), Monitor GitHub for repositories used as C2 channels (e.g., frequent updates to index.html/requirements.txt) and Educate developers on risks of typosquatting, dependency confusion, and postinstall scripts, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Developers advised to remove 'susvsex' extension and scan systems for Vidar Infostealer.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including malicious Visual Studio Code (VS Code) extension named susvsex... uploaded by suspublisher18, and 17 trojanized npm packages... distributing the Vidar infostealer and Software Deployment Tools (T1072) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating automatically executed ransomware-like functionality upon installation or VS Code launch. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating postinstall Scripts (commonly use PowerShell in npm packages) and Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript (T1059.007) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including vS Code extension... automatically executed ransomware-like functionality, and trojanized npm packages... distributing the Vidar infostealer. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating automatically executed... upon installation or VS Code launch (implies persistence mechanism). Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating aI-generated (vibe-coded) malware (may exploit misconfigurations or unpatched vulnerabilities). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating aI-generated (vibe-coded) malware—with sloppy comments and placeholder variables (may include obfuscation), Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating files... encrypted (originals likely deleted/replaced), and Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules (T1564.008) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating accidentally exposed decryption tools, C2 server code, and GitHub access tokens (attempt to hide artifacts failed). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.005) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating vidar Infostealer (credentials, cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, etc.), Steal Web Session Cookie (T1539) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating vidar Infostealer (credentials, cookies...), and Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrates cryptocurrency wallets and payment details. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified File and Directory Discovery (T1083) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating zipped, exfiltrated, and encrypted files from predefined test directories and System Owner/User Discovery (T1033) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating targeted developer environments (implies user context discovery). Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including zipped... files from predefined test directories, and vidar Infostealer (credentials, cookies, cryptocurrency wallets) and Data Staged: Local Data Staging (T1074.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating zipped... files (staged for exfiltration). Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating gitHub-based C2 channel... commands were fetched from a private repository, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (T1071.001) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including gitHub as a command-and-control (C2) server, and bullethost.cloud (Vidar payload host), and Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services (T1583.006) with moderate to high confidence (85%), with evidence including gitHub as a command-and-control (C2) server, and bullethost.cloud. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Channel (T1048.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating zIP archives uploaded to remote server (likely encrypted channel), Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating zIP archives uploaded to remote server (may use HTTP/HTTPS), and Automated Exfiltration (T1020) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating automatically... zipped, exfiltrated, and encrypted files. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including encrypted files from predefined test directories, and ransomware-like functionality, Data Destruction (T1485) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating files... encrypted (originals likely overwritten/deleted), and Malicious Image Deployment (T1659) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating trojanized npm packages (may include malicious container images). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.