LG Energy Solution Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (LGE5202152111925)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the LG Energy Solution breach identified under incident ID LGE5202152111925.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of LG Energy Solution's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/lgenergysolution, the number of followers: 76986, the industry type: Chemical Manufacturing and the number of employees: 6550 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 818 and after the incident was 747 with a difference of -71 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on LG Energy Solution and their customers.

LG Energy Solution recently reported "LG Energy Solution Ransomware Attack by Akira Gang", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

LG Energy Solution, one of the world’s largest battery makers, confirmed a ransomware attack by the Akira gang, which claimed to have stolen 1.7 TB of data, including corporate documents and employee databases.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting specific overseas facility, and exposing corporate documents and employee information databases.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like isolation of affected facility, and began remediation that includes security measures implemented and investigation conducted, while recovery efforts such as facility restored to normal operations continue, and stakeholders are being briefed through public statement confirming attack and limited details shared.

The case underscores how ongoing (precautionary security operations and investigations).

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware attack targeting a specific overseas facility (no vector specified, but common for Akira) and Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating targeted a specific overseas facility (possible compromised credentials for initial access). Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating stole **1.7 terabytes of data**, including corporate documents and employee databases and Automated Exfiltration (T1020) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating 1.7 TB exfiltration suggests automated tools (typical for Akira ransomware). Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware attack (Akira typically encrypts data, though not explicitly confirmed here) and Data Destruction (T1485) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating temporary disruption (possible secondary impact, but no confirmation of destruction). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping (T1003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating employee databases compromised (common target for credential harvesting in ransomware) and Credentials from Password Stores (T1555) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating employee information databases accessed (may include password hashes or stores). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating akira ransomware known to delete logs/artifacts (implied by lack of detection details) and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating temporary disruption suggests possible tampering with security tools during attack. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating corporate documents and employee databases stolen from local facility systems and Data from Network Shared Drive (T1039) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating 1.7 TB suggests collection from shared drives (common in enterprise environments). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.