LG Energy Solution Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (LGE4092240111925)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the LG Energy Solution breach identified under incident ID LGE4092240111925.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of LG Energy Solution's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/lgenergysolution, the number of followers: 76986, the industry type: Chemical Manufacturing and the number of employees: 6550 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 778 and after the incident was 689 with a difference of -89 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on LG Energy Solution and their customers.

LG Energy Solution recently reported "Ransomware Attack on LG Energy Solution Overseas Facility", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

LG Energy Solution, a South Korean battery manufacturer and subsidiary of LG, confirmed a ransomware attack targeting one of its overseas facilities.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting one specific overseas facility, and exposing employee personal information (visas, US/Korean passports, medical documents, Korean ID cards, addresses, phones, emails), confidential projects and NDAs.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Isolation of affected facility and Mitigation of attack spread, and began remediation that includes Recovery of impacted systems and Security operations enhancement, while recovery efforts such as Restoration of facility operations to normal continue, and stakeholders are being briefed through Public statement confirming attack and mitigation and No further details disclosed during investigation.

The case underscores how Ongoing (LG Energy Solution conducting security operations and investigations).

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating one of its overseas facilities targeted; no specific vector but ransomware often exploits vulnerable services and Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating overseas facility breach may involve compromised credentials (common Akira TTP). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers (T1555.005) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating employee records (emails, passwords) likely harvested for lateral movement and OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager (T1003.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating sQL databases (46GB) exfiltrated; may contain hashed credentials. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating 1.7TB of data stolen, including SQL databases, confidential projects, employee records and Data from Network Shared Drive (T1039) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating corporate documents (NDAs, financials) likely stored on shared drives. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating 1.7TB of data exfiltrated (Akira typically uses FTP/SMB for large transfers) and Automated Exfiltration: Traffic Duplication (T1020.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating large-scale data theft (1.7TB) suggests automated collection tools. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware attack (Akira strain) implies encryption of systems and Data Destruction (T1485) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware may include wiper functionality (not confirmed but common with Akira). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating akira typically deletes logs/artifacts post-exfiltration (implied by stealthy operation) and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating facility temporarily disrupted suggests defenses may have been tampered with. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating overseas facility breach may involve RDP for internal pivoting (common Akira TTP). Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography (T1573.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating akira uses encrypted C2 channels for exfiltration (implied by 1.7TB transfer). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.