Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (KAWMIZPLANOR1767987352)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. breach identified under incident ID KAWMIZPLANOR1767987352.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd.'s information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/kawasaki-heavy-industries, the number of followers: 103734, the industry type: Industrial Machinery Manufacturing and the number of employees: 1380 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 780 and after the incident was 695 with a difference of -85 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. and their customers.

Kawasaki Motors Europe recently reported "Global Ransomware Surge (2023-2025)", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

Ransomware victims increased from ~5,400 in 2023 to 8,000+ in 2025, a 53–63% rise.

Impact assessments are still underway, so the full scope is not yet clear.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how teams are taking away lessons such as The disappearance of successful ransomware groups often results in open competition to attract the most productive affiliates, leading to a rise in overall attacks despite law enforcement efforts.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware attacks surged 53–63% despite takedowns of major groups and External Remote Services (T1133) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating no specific attack vector disclosed, but ransomware groups often exploit remote services. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious File (T1204.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware strains (e.g., Qilin, Cl0p, Play) imply malicious file execution and Command and Scripting Interpreter (T1059) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups often use scripting for lateral movement and execution. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups (e.g., LockBit, ALPHV) often use compromised credentials. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Exploitation for Privilege Escalation (T1068) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups exploit vulnerabilities for privilege escalation. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware strains (e.g., Qilin, Cl0p) use obfuscation to evade detection and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware often disables security tools to avoid detection. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified OS Credential Dumping (T1003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups (e.g., LockBit, ALPHV) dump credentials for lateral movement. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery (T1087) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups conduct account discovery for targeted attacks. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol (T1021.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups often use RDP for lateral movement. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups (e.g., Cl0p) exfiltrate data before encryption. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Application Layer Protocol (T1071) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups use C2 channels for communication and exfiltration. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware groups (e.g., Cl0p, Qilin) exfiltrate data before encryption. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware strains (e.g., Play, INC Ransom) encrypt data for ransom and Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating ransomware often deletes backups to prevent recovery. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.