US Government Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (INT3992239111425)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the US Government breach identified under incident ID INT3992239111425.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of US Government's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/intelligence.gov, the number of followers: 2130, the industry type: Space Research and Technology and the number of employees: 5902 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 767 and after the incident was 749 with a difference of -18 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on US Government and their customers.

On 10 November 2023, U.S. Government Agencies disclosed cybercrime, hacking and espionage issues under the banner "Arrest of Suspected Russian Cybercriminal in Thailand Linked to U.S. Extradition Request".

A 35-year-old Russian national, suspected of launching cyberattacks on government agencies in Europe and the U.S., was detained in Phuket, Thailand, at the request of the U.S.

Impact assessments are still underway, so the full scope is not yet clear.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like detention of suspect and evidence seizure, and stakeholders are being briefed through Russian Embassy statement via TASS, Thai police confirmation to media and FBI no comment.

The case underscores how ongoing (extradition proceedings, identity confirmation pending), with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Russian Embassy seeking consular access and U.S. awaiting extradition.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating hacking political organizations (2016 U.S. election interference) and Trusted Relationship (T1199) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating compromised classified communications, strategic intelligence via insider/3rd-party access. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Credentials from Password Stores: Web Browsers (T1555.003) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating seizure of laptops, mobile devices (likely stored credentials for government targets) and OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory (T1003.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating gRU/APT28 historically uses credential dumping (e.g., 2016 DNC breach). Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrating sensitive data from U.S./European government agencies and Automated Collection (T1119) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating classified communications, strategic intelligence suggest systematic data harvesting. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating leaking stolen information (e.g., via DCLeaks/Guccifer 2.0 in 2016) and Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating digital wallets seized may indicate C2-funded exfiltration infrastructure. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating cyber warfare tactics (though no ransomware confirmed, data destruction possible), Network Denial of Service: Reflection Amplification (T1498.002) with lower confidence (20%), supported by evidence indicating critical infrastructure of sovereign nations targeted (DoS as diversionary tactic), and Account Access Removal (T1531) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating long-term destabilizing effects suggest persistent access revocation post-breach. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools (T1027.005) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating gRU/APT28 known for tool obfuscation (e.g., X-Agent malware in 2016) and Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating seizure of digital evidence implies attempts to erase forensic traces. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Proxy: External Proxy (T1090.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating thailand as safe haven suggests use of regional proxies for C2 traffic and Web Service: Bidirectional Communication (T1102.002) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating digital wallets may fund C2 domains (e.g., 2016 election ops used leased servers). Under the Reconnaissance tactic, the analysis identified Gather Victim Host Information: Software (T1592.002) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating suspect entered Thailand in late October 2023 (pre-operational recon period) and Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses (T1589.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating hacking political organizations requires target email/identity mapping (e.g., 2016 spearphishing). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.