Comparison Overview
Grafana Labs

Grafana Labs
29 Broadway, Penthouse, New York, NY, US, 10006
Last Update: 19/05/2026
Grafana Labs, the company behind the open observability cloud, is founded on the principles of open source, open standards, open ecosystems, and open culture. Grafana Cloud, our fully managed observability platform, is flexible and built for scale, enabling organization...

Snowflake
Menlo Park, CA, US, 94563
Last Update: 14/04/2026
Snowflake delivers the AI Data Cloud — a global network where thousands of organizations mobilize data with near-unlimited scale, concurrency, and performance. Inside the AI Data Cloud, organizations unite their siloed data, easily discover and securely share governed d...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Grafana Labs







Snowflake






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
Grafana Labs has 88.68% more incidents than the average of same-industry companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incidents vs Software Development Industry Avg (This Year)
Snowflake has 560.38% more incidents than the average of all companies with at least one recorded incident.
Incident History - Grafana Labs (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Grafana Labs cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - Snowflake (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Snowflake cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Grafana Labs

Snowflake
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size calculation, resulting in a heap allocation smaller than expected. Subsequent initialization of the buffer wrote beyond the end of the allocation. An unprivileged local user with access to a vt(4) device can trigger an out-of-bounds write in the kernel, potentially escalating privileges.
The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.
Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory could then be reused elsewhere while still accessible through the stale mapping. The /dev/dsp device nodes are world-accessible by default. On a system with an audio device, either issue allows an unprivileged local user to read and write kernel memory, which can be used to escalate privileges, potentially gaining full control of the affected system. At a minimum, an attacker can crash the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).
The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is not yet set at the point where the auxiliary vector is constructed, so AT_SECURE was incorrectly set to zero for set-user-ID and set-group-ID executables. An unprivileged local user can inject a shared library via LD_PRELOAD into a set-user-ID or set-group-ID Linux binary, gaining the privileges of that binary.
The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. During this window another thread could free the multicast filter structure, leaving the handler with a stale pointer to freed memory. An unprivileged local user can exploit this use-after-free to escalate privileges.