GitHub Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (GIT4192541111325)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the GitHub breach identified under incident ID GIT4192541111325.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of GitHub's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/github, the number of followers: 5068173, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 5536 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 692 and after the incident was 678 with a difference of -14 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on GitHub and their customers.

On 07 November 2023, GitHub (Microsoft) disclosed supply chain attack, typosquatting and malware issues under the banner "Typosquatting Campaign Targeting GitHub Actions via Malicious npm Package '@acitons/artifact'".

On November 7th, Veracode Threat Research discovered a typosquatting campaign targeting developers using GitHub Actions.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting GitHub Actions CI/CD pipelines and developer workstations (via npm install), and exposing GitHub authentication tokens and potential downstream repository access.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like npm package removal ('@acitons/artifact'), removal of two GitHub user accounts linked to malware and blocking 12 versions of related package '8jfiesaf83', and began remediation that includes Veracode Package Firewall protection for customers and advisory for GitHub Actions users to scrutinize dependencies, and stakeholders are being briefed through public disclosure by Veracode and media coverage (e.g., GBH).

The case underscores how resolved (package removed, accounts terminated), teams are taking away lessons such as Typosquatting remains effective for supply chain attacks despite awareness, Obfuscation techniques (shc, encrypted C2) can evade AV detection (0/XX on VirusTotal) and GitHub Actions environment variables are high-value targets for token theft, and recommending next steps like Implement package allowlists for CI/CD dependencies, Use tools like Veracode Package Firewall to block malicious packages and Enable GitHub’s dependency review for Actions workflows, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Developers advised to audit GitHub Actions dependencies for '@acitons/artifact'.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies (T1195.001) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including typosquatting campaign targeting developers using GitHub Actions via malicious npm package @acitons/artifact, and 206,000+ downloads before removal and Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell (T1059.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating post-install hook that executed obfuscated malware compiled via Shell Script Compiler (shc). Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating post-install hook (implies persistence via npm package lifecycle scripts). Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including exfiltrated authentication tokens from GitHub Actions workflows, and publish malicious artifacts under GitHub’s identity. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Obfuscated Files or Information (T1027) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including obfuscated malware undetected by antivirus tools (0/60 on VirusTotal), and compiled via Shell Script Compiler (shc), Software Packing (T1027.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating compiled via Shell Script Compiler (shc), Execution Guardrails (T1480) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating hardcoded expiry dates (Nov 6–7, 2023) (self-termination to evade detection), and Hidden Window: Hidden Window (T1564.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating undetected by antivirus tools (0/60 on VirusTotal) (implies stealthy execution). Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including exfiltrated authentication tokens from GitHub Actions workflows, and checked for GitHub-specific environment variables (e.g., build tokens) and Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys (T1552.004) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating authentication tokens (often include SSH/GPG keys in CI/CD contexts). Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified System Information Discovery (T1082) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating checked for GitHub-specific environment variables (reconnaissance for CI/CD context). Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Automated Collection (T1119) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating post-install hook that executed obfuscated malware (automated token harvesting). Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including aES-encrypted exfiltration via a GitHub App endpoint, and exfiltrated authentication tokens and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating encrypted exfiltration via GitHub App endpoint (abusing legitimate service). Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Endpoint Denial of Service: Application Exhaustion Flood (T1499.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating potential cascading supply chain attacks (disruption via compromised artifacts) and Account Access Removal: Cloud Account (T1498.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating tokens could enable attackers to publish malicious artifacts under GitHub’s identity (account takeover risk). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.