Gainsight Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (GAI1122911112425)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Gainsight breach identified under incident ID GAI1122911112425.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Gainsight's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/gainsight, the number of followers: 157947, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 1100 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 535 and after the incident was 473 with a difference of -62 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Gainsight and their customers.

On 24 November 2025, Salesforce disclosed Data Breach, Unauthorized Access and Supply Chain Attack issues under the banner "Salesforce Data Breach: ShinyHunters Hack via Gainsight Integration".

The ShinyHunters group announced its involvement in a data breach affecting the Salesforce ecosystem, particularly through the compromise of Gainsight and Salesloft integrations.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Salesforce Instances (200+), Gainsight and Salesloft, and exposing True.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Revoked OAuth Tokens, Removed Gainsight Apps from AppExchange and Limited HubSpot/Zendesk Connector Functionality, and began remediation that includes Internal Reviews by Affected Companies and Token Rotation, and stakeholders are being briefed through Public Disclosure via Media (Redazione RHC) and No Direct Comment from Salesforce on Specifics.

The case underscores how Ongoing (Led by Google Mandiant), teams are taking away lessons such as OAuth token security requires stricter rotation and monitoring, Third-party integrations introduce significant supply chain risks and Delayed detection (1–2 weeks) highlights gaps in anomaly monitoring, and recommending next steps like Implement multi-layered authentication for third-party OAuth tokens, Conduct regular audits of integration partners’ security postures and Enhance real-time monitoring for unauthorized access patterns, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Salesforce Revoked Access Keys and Gainsight/HubSpot/Zendesk Limited Connector Functionality.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating exploitation of stolen **OAuth tokens** from **Salesloft’s GitHub account** to infiltrate **Drift’s Salesforce integration** and Trusted Relationship (T1199) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating compromise **Gainsight**, a customer process management platform, via **third-party service integrations** (HubSpot, Zendesk). Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials (T1098.003) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating attackers **gained unauthorized access to over 200 Salesforce instances** via compromised OAuth tokens. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles (T1098.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrating enterprise customer data through **third-party service integrations** (HubSpot, Zendesk). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token (T1550.001) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating exploited **stolen OAuth tokens** from Salesloft’s GitHub account and Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating **delayed detection (1–2 weeks post-intrusion)** suggests log tampering or evasion. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files (T1552.001) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating **stolen OAuth tokens** from Salesloft’s GitHub account and Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating leveraged **stolen OAuth tokens** to access Salesforce integrations. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating compromised **Drift’s Salesforce integration** to pivot to **Gainsight** and other services and Internal Spearphishing (T1534) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating shinyHunters **sought internal accomplices** for further exploitation. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrating **enterprise customer data** through third-party integrations and Data from Cloud Storage Object: CRM Data (T1213.002) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating access to **Salesforce CRM data** and **Gainsight customer process management**. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrated data via **third-party service integrations (HubSpot, Zendesk)** and Automated Exfiltration: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage (T1020.002) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating **enterprise customer data** exfiltrated through cloud-based integrations. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Destruction (T1485) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating **temporary disruption** of Gainsight apps on AppExchange (no confirmed destruction) and Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation (T1659) with lower confidence (40%), supported by evidence indicating **identity theft risk** (high) due to exposed PII, but no direct manipulation confirmed. Under the Command and Control tactic, the analysis identified Web Service: One-Way Communication (T1102.003) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltration via **third-party integrations (HubSpot, Zendesk)** likely used as C2 channels. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.