Gainsight Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (GAI0292402112125)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Gainsight breach identified under incident ID GAI0292402112125.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Gainsight's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/gainsight, the number of followers: 157947, the industry type: Software Development and the number of employees: 1100 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 762 and after the incident was 606 with a difference of -156 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Gainsight and their customers.

Gainsight recently reported "Gainsight Unauthorized Salesforce Data Access via Stolen OAuth Tokens", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

Gainsight applications enabled unauthorized access to Salesforce customer data due to stolen OAuth tokens linked to the August 2025 Salesloft breach.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Salesforce Instances (760 in Salesloft breach) and Gainsight-published Applications, and exposing True, with nearly ['1.5 Billion (Salesloft Breach)', 'Undisclosed (Gainsight Breach)'] records at risk.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Token Revocation (OAuth/Refresh Tokens) and AppExchange Removal, and began remediation that includes Customer Notifications and Investigation, and stakeholders are being briefed through Direct Customer Notifications and Public Statement.

The case underscores how Ongoing (Customer Notifications in Progress), with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Direct Notifications to Affected Customers.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including stolen OAuth tokens tied to Salesloft’s Drift AI chat integration with Salesforce, and entry point such as Stolen OAuth Tokens (Salesloft Drift Integration) and Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including aPI Abuse under attack_vector, and unauthorized API access to 760 Salesforce instances. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials (T1098.003) with moderate to high confidence (85%), with evidence including stolen OAuth tokens ... granted unauthorized API access, and weak or Stolen OAuth Token Management. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API (T1552.007) with moderate to high confidence (80%), with evidence including 1.5 billion records, including passwords, AWS keys, and Snowflake tokens, and exfiltrated from 760 Salesforce instances and Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including stole OAuth tokens tied to Salesloft’s Drift AI chat integration, and shinyHunters exploited the stolen credentials. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including tokens granted unauthorized API access, and revoking all active Gainsight-associated tokens and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall (T1562.007) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating temporarily removing its apps from the AppExchange to mitigate further exposure. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (T1021.002) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating unauthorized access to Salesforce customer data via Gainsight applications and Remote Services: SSH (T1021.004) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating aPI access to 760 Salesforce instances. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including exfiltration of 1.5 billion records, including passwords, AWS keys, and Snowflake tokens, and extracting customer contact data, licensing information, and support case contents and Data from Cloud Storage: Cloud API (T1213.002) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including unauthorized API access to Salesforce instances, and exfiltrated Gainsight customer contact and licensing data. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (85%), with evidence including exfiltration of 1.5 billion records, and data exfiltration such as true and Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating data sold on dark web such as Likely (Historical ShinyHunters Behavior). Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Destruction: Local Data Destruction (T1485.001) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating revoked all active and refresh tokens associated with Gainsight-published apps, Resource Hijacking: Cloud Resources (T1496.002) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating compromising sensitive corporate and customer data across hundreds of organizations, and Malicious Service Account (T1659) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating gainsight’s external app connections compromising sensitive data. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.