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Great companies have an enduring sense of purpose. At M&T, our purpose is a simple one: make a difference in people’s lives and uplift the diverse communities we serve. Founded in 1856 in Buffalo, NY we are now a top 11 full-service US-based commercial bank with a retail footprint across the east coast and wealth services available nationwide and abroad. As a bank, we offer advice, guidance, expertise, and solutions across the entire financial spectrum that combines M&T’s traditional banking services with the wealth management and institutional capabilities offered by Wilmington Trust. We are a community-minded organization with more than 167 years of experience. We serve customers, community, and colleagues whether they be across the street, across the state or across the country. As an employer of choice, we are proud to offer competitive benefits ranging from medical and retirement to forty hours of paid volunteer time, each year. Our core values drive the work we do – integrity, ownership, collaboration, curiosity, candor and we seek to further build upon our record of success by bringing in diverse talents and fresh skill sets while continuing to support the growth and development of all our team members. M&T Bank Corporation is an Equal Opportunity Employer, including disabilities and veterans.
Security & Compliance Standards Overview
No incidents recorded for FinanceFeeds in 2025.
No incidents recorded for M&T Bank in 2025.
FinanceFeeds cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
M&T Bank cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries
Last 3 Security & Risk Events by Company
A vulnerability was determined in motogadget mo.lock Ignition Lock up to 20251125. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the component NFC Handler. Executing manipulation can lead to use of hard-coded cryptographic key . The physical device can be targeted for the attack. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. The exploitation appears to be difficult. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the interview attachment retrieval endpoint in the Recruitment module serves files based solely on an authenticated session and user-supplied identifiers, without verifying whether the requester has permission to access the associated interview record. Because the server does not perform any recruitment-level authorization checks, an ESS-level user with no access to recruitment workflows can directly request interview attachment URLs and receive the corresponding files. This exposes confidential interview documents—including candidate CVs, evaluations, and supporting files—to unauthorized users. The issue arises from relying on predictable object identifiers and session presence rather than validating the user’s association with the relevant recruitment process. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the application’s recruitment attachment retrieval endpoint does not enforce the required authorization checks before serving candidate files. Even users restricted to ESS-level access, who have no permission to view the Recruitment module, can directly access candidate attachment URLs. When an authenticated request is made to the attachment endpoint, the system validates the session but does not confirm that the requesting user has the necessary recruitment permissions. As a result, any authenticated user can download CVs and other uploaded documents for arbitrary candidates by issuing direct requests to the attachment endpoint, leading to unauthorized exposure of sensitive applicant data. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the application does not invalidate existing sessions when a user is disabled or when a password change occurs, allowing active session cookies to remain valid indefinitely. As a result, a disabled user, or an attacker using a compromised account, can continue to access protected pages and perform operations as long as a prior session remains active. Because the server performs no session revocation or session-store cleanup during these critical state changes, disabling an account or updating credentials has no effect on already-established sessions. This makes administrative disable actions ineffective and allows unauthorized users to retain full access even after an account is closed or a password is reset, exposing the system to prolonged unauthorized use and significantly increasing the impact of account takeover scenarios. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
OrangeHRM is a comprehensive human resource management (HRM) system. From version 5.0 to 5.7, the password reset workflow does not enforce that the username submitted in the final reset request matches the account for which the reset process was originally initiated. After obtaining a valid reset link for any account they can receive email for, an attacker can alter the username parameter in the final reset request to target a different user. Because the system accepts the supplied username without verification, the attacker can set a new password for any chosen account, including privileged accounts, resulting in full account takeover. This issue has been patched in version 5.8.
