Farmers Insurance Group Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (SALFAR1767922939)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Farmers Insurance Group breach identified under incident ID SALFAR1767922939.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Farmers Insurance Group's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/farmersinsurance-group, the number of followers: 231, the industry type: Consumer Services and the number of employees: 59 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 775 and after the incident was 749 with a difference of -26 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Farmers Insurance Group and their customers.

Farmers Insurance recently reported "Farmers Insurance Data Breach", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

Farmers Insurance, a U.S.-based insurance provider, was the victim of a significant data breach affecting 1.1 million customers.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Third-party Salesforce CRM database, and exposing 1,111,386 records, with nearly 1,111,386 records at risk.

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Investigation launched, unauthorized access contained, and stakeholders are being briefed through Public disclosure on company website, regulator notifications.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as The breach highlights the risks of third-party vendor vulnerabilities, particularly in CRM systems like Salesforce. Social engineering remains a primary attack vector, emphasizing the need for robust vendor risk management, zero-trust security models, and ongoing security awareness training. Organizations must also ensure isolation, token rotation, and IP allowlists for third-party integrations, and recommending next steps like Implement robust vendor risk management with ongoing scrutiny of third-party connections, Adopt zero-trust security models as a standard practice and Enhance incident response readiness with rapid detection and transparent communication, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Monitor for fraud on affected datasets; prepare communications and FAQs for regulators and customers.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Phishing: Spearphishing via Service (T1566.003) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating tricking employees into approving malicious OAuth apps and Trusted Relationship (T1199) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating exploited initial access provided by Scattered Spider. Under the Execution tactic, the analysis identified User Execution: Malicious Link (T1204.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating social engineering tactics, tricking employees. Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials (T1098.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating rogue OAuth app via social engineering to infiltrate Salesforce CRM. Under the Privilege Escalation tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating exploited initial access provided by Scattered Spider to Salesforce CRM. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating rogue OAuth app via social engineering to gain access to Salesforce systems. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Information Repositories: Code Repositories (T1213.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrate data from Salesforce CRM instances and Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating names, addresses, birth dates, driver’s license details compromised. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Transfer Data to Cloud Account (T1537) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating data breach impacting 1.1 million customers and Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating shinyHunters claimed responsibility for data exfiltration. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Destruction (T1485) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating no details on malware’s origin or extent of breach. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.