CrowdStrike Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (CRO4432044112225)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the CrowdStrike breach identified under incident ID CRO4432044112225.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of CrowdStrike's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/crowdstrike, the number of followers: 955946, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 10400 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 742 and after the incident was 708 with a difference of -34 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on CrowdStrike and their customers.

CrowdStrike recently reported "CrowdStrike Insider Threat Incident Involving Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

CrowdStrike confirmed that internal screenshots shared by a now-terminated employee were leaked by the Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters cybercrime collective on Telegram.

The disruption is felt across the environment, and exposing Internal Screenshots and SSO Authentication Cookies (Attempted).

In response, teams activated the incident response plan, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Termination of Insider Access and Revocation of Compromised Credentials, and stakeholders are being briefed through Public Statement and Media Engagement.

The case underscores how Ongoing (Law Enforcement Involved), teams are taking away lessons such as Importance of insider threat monitoring, rapid credential revocation, and proactive dark web intelligence to mitigate leaks from disgruntled or compromised employees. Highlights the growing collaboration among cybercriminal groups (e.g., Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters) in extortion campaigns, and recommending next steps like Enhance insider threat detection programs with behavioral analytics, Implement stricter access controls and just-in-time (JIT) privilege escalation and Monitor dark web/Telegram channels for leaked credentials or internal data, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering CrowdStrike reassured customers that no systems or customer data were compromised.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including insider Threat (Malicious Employee) abused SSO authentication cookies for access, and initial_access_broker.entry point such as Insider (Terminated Employee) and Phishing: Spearphishing via Voice (Vishing) (T1566.002) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating social Engineering (Voice-Phishing) linked to Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Cookies (T1550.004) with high confidence (95%), with evidence including credential Theft (SSO Authentication Cookies) sold for $25,000, and high value targets such as SSO Authentication Cookies and Valid Accounts: Default Accounts (T1078.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating insider abuse of access privileges (legitimate account misuse). Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with high confidence (90%), with evidence including dark Web/Telegram Leak of internal screenshots, and data exfiltration such as true and Automated Exfiltration: Traffic Duplication (T1020.001) with moderate to high confidence (75%), supported by evidence indicating internal Screenshots leaked (implies capture/transmission of display data). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating use of SSO authentication cookies to bypass MFA/access controls and Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools (T1562.001) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating inadequate monitoring of credential exfiltration attempts (evaded detection initially). Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Malicious Insider (T1659) with high confidence (100%), with evidence including insider Threat (Malicious Employee) terminated for leaking data, and root causes such as Insider abuse of access privileges and Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with lower confidence (10%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltration such as true (no encryption confirmed, but included in ransomware context). Under the Persistence tactic, the analysis identified Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials (T1098.003) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating sSO authentication cookies could enable persistent access if not revoked. Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating sSO cookies could allow movement across cloud services (hypothetical). These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.