Cooper Steel Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (COO11101911112525)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Cooper Steel breach identified under incident ID COO11101911112525.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Cooper Steel's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/cooper-steel-usa, the number of followers: 13555, the industry type: Construction and the number of employees: 232 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 700 and after the incident was 637 with a difference of -63 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Cooper Steel and their customers.

Cooper Steel Fabricators recently reported "Cooper Steel Fabricators Data Breach and FTP Server Leak", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

Cooper Steel Fabricators, a U.S.-based structural steel fabricator serving clients like Amazon, was allegedly breached by a threat actor.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting FTP server, and exposing 3D models, drawings and frames.

Formal response steps have not been shared publicly yet.

The case underscores how unconfirmed (Cooper Steel has not acknowledged the breach).

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating fTP server (330 GB) compromised; no explicit vector but public-facing FTP is likely entry point and Valid Accounts (T1078) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating fTP server breach *may* involve abused credentials (no explicit confirmation but common for FTP). Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Local System (T1005) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating complete mirror of the company’s FTP server (330 GB) including proprietary 3D models, engineering drawings and Data from Network Shared Drive (T1039) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating fTP server (network shared drive) mirrored; files include CAD, PDFs, project documents. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol (T1048.003) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating 330 GB of data exfiltrated via FTP (unencrypted protocol); no C2 mentioned and Automated Exfiltration: Traffic Duplication (T1020.001) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating complete mirror suggests automated bulk duplication of FTP server contents. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Data Theft for Extortion (T1659) with high confidence (100%), with evidence including demanded $28,500 in cryptocurrency for the stolen data, and data exfiltration such as true + ransom_demanded field and Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486) with lower confidence (5%), supported by evidence indicating data encryption such as false in ransomware section (included for completeness; low confidence). Under the Lateral Movement tactic, the analysis identified Remote Services: Windows Admin Shares (T1021.006) with lower confidence (30%), supported by evidence indicating fTP server compromise *may* imply lateral movement if connected to internal shares (speculative). Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Indicator Removal: File Deletion (T1070.004) with lower confidence (40%), supported by evidence indicating no logs/evidence mentioned; FTP mirrors often leave minimal traces if files deleted post-exfil. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.