Cloudflare Breach Incident Score: Analysis & Impact (SALCLO1768392789)

In this Rankiteo incident briefing, we review the Cloudflare breach identified under incident ID SALCLO1768392789.

The analysis begins with a detailed overview of Cloudflare's information like the linkedin page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/cloudflare, the number of followers: 1125000, the industry type: Computer and Network Security and the number of employees: 6599 employees

After the initial compromise, the video explains how Rankiteo's incident engine converts technical details into a normalized incident score. The incident score before the incident was 645 and after the incident was 632 with a difference of -13 which is could be a good indicator of the severity and impact of the incident.

In the next step of the video, we will analyze in more details the incident and the impact it had on Cloudflare and their customers.

Palo Alto Networks recently reported "Salesforce Data Breach via Salesloft Drift Third-Party Integration", a noteworthy cybersecurity incident.

A supply chain attack involving the compromise of OAuth tokens from the Salesloft Drift third-party application, leading to mass exfiltration of sensitive data from Salesforce objects such as Account, Contact, Case, and Opportunity records.

The disruption is felt across the environment, affecting Salesforce CRM platform (Account, Contact, Case, Opportunity objects), and exposing Business contact information (names, email addresses, job titles, phone numbers, regional/location details), product licensing and commercial information, plain text content from support cases (including logs, tokens, passwords), Salesforce Object Query Language (SOQL) queries, attachments/files/images in some cases.

In response, moved swiftly to contain the threat with measures like Rotation of credentials, review of Salesforce login history and audit trails, revocation of unused OAuth tokens, enforcement of token expiration, and began remediation that includes Strengthening SaaS environments and toolchain security, periodic review of third-party contracts for security language, enhanced monitoring of API access logs, and stakeholders are being briefed through Public disclosures via blogs and statements, customer advisories to rotate credentials, transparency about incident details and responsibility.

The case underscores how Ongoing, teams are taking away lessons such as Third-party integrations pose significant supply chain risks, OAuth tokens must be treated with the same security as passwords, zero trust principles (e.g., token expiration, periodic revocation) are critical, API security and monitoring must be prioritized, transparency and accountability in incident response build trust, and recommending next steps like Conduct thorough reviews of Salesforce login history, audit trails, and API access logs for unusual activity, Rotate credentials and revoke unused OAuth tokens and Enforce token expiration and periodic token refreshes, with advisories going out to stakeholders covering Customers urged to rotate credentials, review Salesforce logs for suspicious activity, and treat any shared support case data as compromised.

Finally, we try to match the incident with the MITRE ATT&CK framework to see if there is any correlation between the incident and the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework is a knowledge base of techniques and sub-techniques that are used to describe the tactics and procedures of cyber adversaries. It is a powerful tool for understanding the threat landscape and for developing effective defense strategies.

Rankiteo's analysis has identified several MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques associated with this incident, each with varying levels of confidence based on available evidence. Under the Initial Access tactic, the analysis identified Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (T1078.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating stolen OAuth tokens used to access Salesforce environments via the Drift Connected App and Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain (T1195.002) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating supply chain attack targeting Salesloft Drift, a third-party Salesforce integration. Under the Credential Access tactic, the analysis identified Steal Application Access Token (T1528) with high confidence (95%), supported by evidence indicating stolen OAuth tokens used to execute SOQL queries on Salesforce objects and Unsecured Credentials: Chat Messages (T1552.008) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating credentials shared with vendors stored in insecure notes fields in support cases. Under the Discovery tactic, the analysis identified Account Discovery: Cloud Account (T1087.004) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating sOQL queries executed on Account, Contact, Case, and Opportunity records and Password Policy Discovery (T1201) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating scanned for credentials in support case data and insecure notes fields. Under the Collection tactic, the analysis identified Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint (T1213.002) with moderate to high confidence (80%), supported by evidence indicating exfiltrated business contact information, support case details from Salesforce and Data from Local System (T1005) with moderate to high confidence (85%), supported by evidence indicating mass-exfiltrated data from Account, Contact, Case, and Opportunity objects. Under the Exfiltration tactic, the analysis identified Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (T1041) with high confidence (90%), supported by evidence indicating mass-exfiltrated data using Python/3.11 aiohttp/3.12.15 user agent strings and Transfer Data to Cloud Account (T1537) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating data exfiltrated from Salesforce to attacker-controlled infrastructure. Under the Defense Evasion tactic, the analysis identified Indicator Removal: Timestomp (T1070.006) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating attackers deleted queries to obscure forensic traces (anti-forensics tactic) and Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules (T1564.008) with moderate confidence (60%), supported by evidence indicating potential manipulation of logs or queries to evade detection. Under the Impact tactic, the analysis identified Account Access Removal (T1531) with moderate to high confidence (70%), supported by evidence indicating customers urged to rotate compromised credentials and Data Destruction (T1485) with moderate confidence (50%), supported by evidence indicating attackers deleted queries to obscure forensic traces. These correlations help security teams understand the attack chain and develop appropriate defensive measures based on the observed tactics and techniques.