Comparison Overview
Christie & Co

Christie & Co
6 Carmelite Street, London, London, GB, EC4Y 0BS
Last Update: 02/04/2026
Christie & Co is a specialist business property adviser in the hotels, pubs & restaurants, leisure, care, childcare & education, retail and medical sectors. With offices across the UK, it focuses on advisory, consultancy, valuation services, and brokerage activity in i...

International Workplace Group plc
Dammstrasse 19, Zug, Switzerland, CH, CH-6300
Last Update: 16/09/2026
IWG: the world’s leading platform for work, revolutionising how and where people work IWG (International Workplace Group) is the global leader in hybrid and platform working. With 4,000+ locations across 120 countries and millions of customers worldwide, IWG empowers bu...
Compliance Ranges Comparison

Christie & Co







International Workplace Group plc






Benchmark & Cyber Underwriting Signals
Incidents vs Real Estate Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for Christie & Co in 2026.
Incidents vs Real Estate Industry Avg (This Year)
No incidents recorded for International Workplace Group plc in 2026.
Incident History - Christie & Co (X = Date, Y = Severity)
Christie & Co cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Incident History - International Workplace Group plc (X = Date, Y = Severity)
International Workplace Group plc cyber incidents detection timeline including parent company and subsidiaries.
Notable Incidents

Christie & Co

International Workplace Group plc
FAQ
Latest Global CVEs
Omni C20 lacks proper certificate validation which could allow an attacker to perform a man-in-the-middle attack which could allow them to execute arbitrary code.
Omni C20 uses hard-coded credentials that could allow an attacker to monitor log files to obtain credentials to access information like mapping data.
The affected products are vulnerable to command injection attack that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to execute system commands during the pairing process.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware contains an authentication vulnerability in the root account exposed through the device's UART interface. The affected account does not require a password before granting access to a privileged system interface, and the interface also displays the device's WiFi password during startup. An unauthenticated attacker with physical access to the device could connect to the UART interface, obtain root privileges, and recover the WiFi password.
The Botslab G980H dash camera firmware generates the default WiFi password using predictable device information, portions of which are advertised by the product. An unauthenticated attacker within WiFi range could potentially determine the remaining password characters through limited guessing and gain unauthorized access to the device network.